人权事务委员会

委员会根据《任择议定书》第五条第四款通过的关于第2926/2017号来文的意见* ** ***

来文提交人：Imran Ali和Bakhtaware Ali(由律师EirikBjorge博士和Mads Andenas教授代理)

据称受害人：Wahaj Ali、Imran Ali和Bakhtaware Ali

所涉缔约国：挪威

来文日期：2017年1月4日(首次提交)

参考文件：根据委员会《议事规则》第92条作出的决定，已于2017年1月5日转交缔约国(未以文件形式印发)

意见通过日期：2022年7月14日

事由：遣返前拘留

程序性问题：可否受理――是否已用尽国内补救办法

实质性问题：任意逮捕和拘留；拘留条件；儿童权利；酷刑；家庭权利

《公约》条款：第七条、第九条、第十七条第一款和第二十四条

《任择议定书》条款：第五条第二款(丑)项

1.1来文提交人Imran Ali(生于1980年)和Bakhtaware Ali(生于1983年)均为阿富汗国民。他们声称，缔约国侵犯了其子Wahaj Ali(阿富汗国民，生于2012年)根据《公约》第二十四条享有的权利，也侵犯了他们根据《公约》第七条、第九条和第十七条第一款享有的权利。《任择议定书》于1976年3月23日对缔约国生效。提交人由律师代理。

1.22018年2月2日，委员会通过新来文和临时措施特别报告员行事，决定驳回缔约国关于将来文可否受理问题与实质问题分开审理的请求。

提交人陈述的事实

2.1来文事涉提交人及其子(当时介于1岁到2岁之间)被连续拘留在位于特兰那姆(Trandum)的挪威警方移民拘留中心达76天。提交人称，2012年7月18日，移民局驳回了他们的庇护申请。2013年2月5日，移民问题上诉委员会驳回了他们的上诉。他们被勒令于2013年3月13日前离开挪威。由于担心自己在阿富汗的生命安全，他们针对上述决定提起上诉，但于2013年3月18日和22日收到了不利决定。 2014年3月17日，提交人及其子被递解出境至阿富汗。但是，在抵达喀布尔之际，他们声称自己是巴基斯坦国民，从而导致阿富汗当局拒绝接收。2014年3月18日，提交人及其子被关入位于特兰那姆的警方移民拘留中心。

2.2奥斯陆地区法院通过2014年3月19日的一项裁定，下令将一家人拘留至2014年4月2日。该法院认为，该家庭在限期离境日之后滞留挪威一年多，表明他们确有可能潜逃。鉴于他们在最初被递解出境至阿富汗时曾声称自己是巴基斯坦国民，尤其如此。他们系因此被送回挪威。在挪威，他们确认自己是阿富汗国民，并表示非常希望留在挪威。该法院得出结论认为：他们不会自愿返回阿富汗；鉴于存在潜逃风险，除拘留外，别无他法。该法院援引《移民法》关于采用强制性措施的第99条和《儿童权利公约》，考虑了提交人关于其有一名2012年5月出生的婴儿因而拘留属不相称举措的主张。但是，该法院认定，该情况下，拘留并非不相称举措。拟将该家庭拘留在特兰那姆拘留中心的家庭区。在那里，他们的儿子可以进入室外玩耍区。该法院指出，在这个问题上，儿童福祉服务机构未针对让提交人之子留在家庭区提出异议。将把该家庭带往阿富汗使馆，以便获得旅行证件。

2.32014年3月25日，博勒加廷(Borgarting)高等法院维持了奥斯陆地区法院的裁定。2014年4月1日，最高法院在两项裁定中也维持了上述裁定。随后，奥斯陆地区法院作出了拘留该家庭的一系列裁定：于2014年4月2日裁定拘留四周；于2014年4月30日裁定拘留两周；于2014年5月14日裁定拘留两周(博勒加廷高等法院于2014年5月16日维持了该裁定)；于2014年5月28日裁定拘留两周。在所有后续裁定中，均重申了2014年3月19日裁定所依据的理由。尽管所有裁定亦涉及提交人之子，但他并未被视为当事人。该家庭于2014年6月2日被送往阿富汗。

2.4提交人评论称，特兰那姆中心的设施设备简陋，不适合有幼童的家庭居住一晚以上。多数家庭不在那里居住更长时间。该家庭住在一间夜间上锁的小牢房内。提交人之子因有警察在场而受到惊吓，出现发烧症状。他吃不了“劣质”食物。上述食物使他产生过敏反应，体重下降。起初，警察拒绝让他在牢房外玩耍，称这会违反规定。这种状况导致他哭泣。Ali女士在绝望当中用头撞击牢房门。最后，一名警察允许其子在牢房外待到晚上10点。后来，他生病了，过了一个星期才见到医生。尽管当局声称家庭区与该中心其他区域之间是有屏蔽的，但他们仍能听到被拘留人员的哭喊声，包括每次去室外或是去咨询医生或法律顾问之时。他们还目睹了试图自残和自杀的情况。这对其子产生了深远的影响。他会在夜间哭闹。截至2014年3月22日，儿童福祉服务机构尚未对该家庭进行探访。他们感到万般沮丧。

2.5提交人之子的睡眠模式受到干扰。他在夜间会一直醒着。儿童福祉服务机构认为，这是因为白天缺乏活动。他病情越来越重，表现出严重的发烧症状，尤其是在晚上10点以后。一天夜里，他的状态特别糟糕。提交人要求允许他们去游戏室并允许他们看医生，但没有成功，从而导致他们寻找可以用来自杀的物品。当儿童福祉服务机构将他们带出该中心以便其子可以玩耍时，有很多身穿制服的警察在场，让他们觉得自己像罪犯。看到其他孩子来到该中心后又离开，使他更觉沮丧。

2.6据提交人称，挪威心理学协会人权委员会的一份报告当中指出，特兰那姆中心不适合儿童，其运转方式像“监狱”，几乎不允许任何心理学家或精神科医生入内。该报告指出，家庭区不允许进行儿童可能需要的亲密身体接触，且从室外游戏区可以看到高高的铁丝网围栏。不允许儿童保留其玩具、毛绒动物玩具或衣物，父母也不能管理自己孩子的生活。该环境的特点是压力和不稳定。2015年12月，挪威议会监察员兼国家防范酷刑和虐待机制批评该中心不适合儿童，既是因为从位于附近的挪威最大机场传来的噪音之大，也是因为家庭区没有从其他区域屏蔽开来，从而导致儿童接触到骚乱、自残和自杀未遂事件。挪威社会教育工作者和社会工作者联盟负责人认为：在挪威，拘留儿童是非法的；该中心没有为儿童提供令人满意的社会心理环境；现行做法违反《儿童权利公约》的规定。

2.7该中心的主管部门，即国家警署移民管理局，曾承认该中心不是“儿童的理想场所”。该中心是唯一一座不隶属于国家监狱管理局的监狱，因此不受挪威警方常规权力系统管辖。此外，国家警署移民管理局直接向司法大臣和移民大臣负责，因而接受政治指导。据提交人称，公诉机关不会要求拘留儿童，因为拘留儿童违反挪威的刑事法律。

2.8提交人称，他们已用尽国内补救办法，因为他们已向缔约国各级法院系统提交过自己的案件。最高法院的主要裁决表明，他们在寻求进一步补救方面，没有说得过去的成功可能性。

2.9提交人在2017年1月29日的一封信函中表示，他们正住在巴基斯坦。信中附有一份为其子的“恐惧症”开药的病例报告。

申诉

3.1提交人声称，根据《公约》第九条，对其一家人的拘留属任意且非法拘留。根据第九条，依据父母的移民状况对儿童实施拘留始终是非法的，是对儿童权利的侵犯。本案当中，情况尤其如此，因为一家人被拘留时间之长，且当局未能进行妥善的相称性分析，也未能证明较不具侵扰性的措施力度不够。若进行切实的审查，其结果不会是授权将一名婴儿拘留76天。据联合国专家称，对儿童实施移民拘留，绝不会有正当理由；这样的拘留绝不会符合其最大利益，构成明显侵犯儿童权利。同样，儿童权利委员会和联合国难民事务高级专员公署指出，对儿童实施拘留，会对其身体、情感和心理发育产生毁灭性影响。本案当中，对一家人实施拘留，必然会引起提交人之子焦虑。按照要求，他在面谈和法庭诉讼过程中须在场，且在被带出拘留中心时系由警察陪同。夜间一家人被锁在屋内的事实，直接或间接对其福祉造成了严重损害，因为他不得不承受父母的痛苦。家庭区系以并不妥当的方式与成人区隔开，其结果是，幼童必须应对自己因所见所闻而产生的强烈反应。

3.2提交人称，另有一个违反《公约》第九条的情况，因为挪威法律未能满足《公约》就允许剥夺自由的法律制度的质量和明确程度作出的规定。《移民法》第106条第(1)款(b)项规定，“若……有具体理由怀疑某外国国民可能逃避执行某项使其不得不离境的行政决定，可对其实施逮捕并还押候审”。根据第106条第(3)款，“《刑事诉讼法》第174至第191条在适当范围内应予适用。”“在适当范围内”表述遭到了胡萨博委员会的批评。据提交人称，不清楚第174至第191条当中哪一条适用于儿童；这种缺乏明确性的问题，举例来说，在第185条第(2)款中很明显，其中规定最多拘留两周。提交人认为，本案当中的一些裁定似乎适用了第185条第(2)款，而另一些裁定则没有。法院倾向于下令拘留两周，然后多次延长这一拘留期。根据《刑事诉讼法》第184条，须仅作为最后手段对儿童实施拘留，但尽管如此，据胡萨博委员会称，仅有半数案件提到了这一标准。

3.3提交人称，违反了《公约》第七条和第九条，因为对一家人实施拘留之任意性质，拘留之持续性质，拘留条件之艰苦――包括暴露在骚乱面前、目睹或害怕自残或自杀事件在内，以及身心健康服务之不足，累积起来对一家人造成了严重且不可逆转的伤害。

3.4提交人还称，侵犯了其子根据《公约》第二十四条享有的权利，且违反了《公约》涉及整个家庭的第十七条第一款。当局几乎未有任何举动来提出与拘留相比侵扰性较小的其他措施，例如将一家人安排在另一类住处，或是要求他们报告自己的行踪――提交人曾表示他们会接受这一条件。此外，博勒加廷高等法院在2014年3月25日的裁定中驳回了拘留替代办法，理由是提交人未说明除特兰那姆中心外他们还可以住在哪里，尽管其律师曾建议让其住进庇护中心。当局和法院没有考虑拘留的替代办法，没有提供证据证明曾考虑过拘留是否相称，也没有妥善考虑提交人之子的处境。

3.5提交人要求缔约国：承认违反了《公约》；向一家人道歉；并向其提供充分的赔偿，包括为其承受的精神压力和心理痛苦作出赔偿，赔偿金额为每个家庭成员5万美元，法律代理人1万美元。他们还要求缔约国保证：将停止在特兰那姆中心拘留儿童；在当局认为有必要实施移民拘留时，将对必要性进行妥善的逐案评估；考虑采取较不具侵扰性的替代措施；规定一项对继续拘留是否必要定期进行独立审查的程序；提供有效的司法审查。他们还要求修订挪威法律，废除以儿童或其父母的移民状况或移民相关违法行为为由对儿童实施的任何形式拘留。

缔约国关于可否受理的意见

4.1缔约国在2017年3月14日的意见当中指出，来文因未用尽国内补救办法而不可受理，因为提交人未针对地区法院2014年4月2日、4月30日和5月28日的裁定，也未针对博勒加廷高等法院2014年5月16日的裁定，提起上诉。缔约国指出，提交人有权获得免费法律援助，且拥有两名技艺精湛的律师。

4.2缔约国指出，提交人未根据《刑事诉讼法》第184条最后一款和《移民法》第106条要求撤销其拘留令。他们也从未根据《刑事诉讼法》第185条最后一款要求法院予以释放――若法院认定警方在努力获得移送出境所需的身份文件方面“办理速度未达到应有水平”，且“继续还押不合理”，法院可“在任何时候”准予释放。最后，提交人未根据《刑事诉讼法》第187(a)条请求释放――根据该条内容，还押候审者“在法院或检察机关认定还押候审的理由不复适用后，即应释放”。

4.3缔约国称，国内补救办法是可用且有效的。首先，最高法院在HR-2016-00619-U案中的判决比该家庭的拘留日期晚了两年，所以说并未杜绝任何针对法院裁定上诉成功的可能性。第二，上述判决事涉将一个家庭拘留8天，以便再过10天后将其移送出境，而不是本案中所说的76天，且最高法院认为，随着时间的推移，法院必须对继续拘留的申请进行更严格的评估(Rt. 2007,第797页)。所以说，最高法院于2014年4月1日，即其拘留14天后下达的判决，并未杜绝任何未来上诉成功的可能性。提交人在被拘留的后期本可合理地期待最高法院再进行一次评估。第三，缺乏合理的成功可能性之说，与各级法院对根据《移民法》第106条提出的拘留申请进行严格审查并在拘留不相称或不符合挪威的国际义务时下令释放的做法存在矛盾。缔约国援引了奥斯陆地区法院2014年10月1日关于释放一位母亲及其3岁女儿的裁定以及博勒加廷高等法院2016年8月12日关于释放一个拥有4名儿童的家庭的裁定。

4.4此外，提交人未向最高法院援引《公约》第七条、第九条、第十七条第一款和第二十四条，也未从实质上主张《公约》第七条、第十七条和第二十四条遭到违反。提交人也未提出《刑事诉讼法》第174至第191条中哪些保障适用于被拘留儿童并不明确的问题。提交人本可向最高法院提出上述问题。最高法院可以对法律是否适用于某一案件的事实进行审查。

提交人对缔约国关于可否受理的意见的评论

5.1提交人在其2017年4月10日的评论意见中指出，缔约国未提出异议的是，就2014年4月2日结束的第一阶段拘留而言，提交人已通过向最高法院上诉而用尽了国内补救办法。提交人还主张，就整个拘留期而言，他们已用尽了所有具备合理的成功可能性的切实有效的国内补救办法。最高法院2014年4月1日的判决是其宣布对移民儿童实施拘留的首批判决之一。显然，自此以后，该法院将批准此类拘留，除非提交人的情况有重大变化。该法院驳回了2016年就拘留儿童问题向其提起的下一次上诉，且从未宣布将有婴儿的家庭拘留在特兰那姆中心是非法的。

5.2提交人针对《刑事诉讼法》第184和第185条最后一款以及第187条原本会有效之说提出异议，因为在每个新的拘留期开始时，是不可能越过奥斯陆地区法院对拘留是否合法进行的审查而要求停止对一家人实施拘留的。此外，第185条和第187条是为刑事诉讼设计的，而本案并非事关刑事诉讼。

5.3提交人坚称，缔约国试图在2017年大选背景下推迟委员会对该来文的审议，以便延长对移民儿童实施的拘留。提交人指出，“凡国内最高法院的裁判规程已就争议事项作出裁决从而消除了任何向国内法院上诉成功可能性的情况下，提交人无须用尽国内补救办法”。他们还指出，根据国际判例：“若申诉人已向国内最高一级主管部门提交诉讼，即已足够”；“若结果必然是重复已作出的裁定”，则没有必要寻求进一步的补救措施。其律师的专业知识所表明的是，当他们未针对所有裁定提起上诉时，他们知道自己在做什么。

5.4此外，提交人坚称，最高法院的审查权限是有限的。最高法院在其2014年4月1日的裁定中指出，根据《刑事诉讼法》第388条第(1)款以及该法院的判例(Rt. 1998,第1599页)，其权限仅限于审查案件的处理情况以及高等法院对法律的解释。因此，该法院对提交人援引《儿童权利公约》第三条和《保护人权与基本自由公约》(以下简称《欧洲人权公约》)第5条不予理会。该法院也不能审查拘留是否相称、是否必要，不能审查任何新的事实。此外，最高法院的裁定(Rt. 2007,第797页)不具相关性，因为该法院在其案件中并未采取同样的处理办法。缔约国此前从未表示最高法院可以审查拘留是否符合缔约国根据各项人权条约承担的义务。

5.5此外，博勒加廷高等法院2014年5月16日的裁定支持对该家庭实施拘留。当时，拘留已持续了八周，表明此前任何时候均不会有任何上诉机关认定拘留不合法，也不会有任何上诉机关认定奥斯陆地区法院2014年5月28日的裁定不合法。

5.62017年6月23日，提交人提供了博勒加廷高等法院2017年5月31日一项判决的副本，其中宣布2014年在特兰那姆中心对一个有孩子的家庭实施的“期限短得多”的拘留不合法。2017年8月22日，提交人作出说明，称上述判决已成为终审判决。

缔约国关于可否受理和实质问题的意见

6.1缔约国在2018年6月6日的意见当中指出了各法院下令和确认对该家庭实施拘留的理由，包括与提交人之子权利有关的理由。来文当中略去了以下信息：博勒加廷高等法院2014年3月25日裁定当中对提交人之子在特兰那姆中心的处境给予考虑的内容；拘留的替代办法；有关警方计划将该家庭带到阿富汗大使馆以获取证件的信息。缔约国还指出，警方在其2014年3月28日的申请当中告知奥斯陆地区法院，儿童福祉服务机构建议提交人之子最好与父母待在一起并多去户外玩耍。该机构还建议给他多拿一些玩具，或是拿一些不同的玩具，并宣布打算每周对该家庭进行一次探访。警方表示：自2014年3月24日起，夜间不再将该家庭锁在屋内；该家庭已被转移到游戏室旁边一个合适的房间。次日，他们被带到一个活动中心。在那里，他们有机会烹饪和玩耍。由于提交人之子自抵达后即患上了感冒，自周一到周五每天由护士对其进行检查。警方表示：家庭区配备了习惯与目标群体互动的具备资质的工作人员；已作出安排，以使该家庭能更多地自行作出决定。

6.2警方随后告知地区法院，儿童福祉服务机构于2014年4月25日探访了该家庭，并发现：尽管身处危机，但提交人之子似乎并未受到周围所发生之事太大影响；不过，若能走出该中心，去户外玩耍，对他会有好处。2014年4月30日，奥斯陆地区法院批准了延长拘留期的申请，但是，为了符合提交人之子的利益，将拘留期定为两周，而不是按照申请定为四周。地区法院认为，他这个年龄的孩子不应待在特兰那姆中心，至少不应长期待在那里。该法院强调：儿童福祉服务机构每周会对该家庭进行两次探访；制定了在四周时间内带其外出活动三次的计划。

6.3地区法院在2014年5月14日的裁决当中，“在怀有一些疑虑情况下”，裁定继续还押并非不相称举措，再次下令将该家庭还押两周，而不是按照申请还押四周。2014年5月16日，博勒加廷高等法院驳回了提交人的上诉，强调警方在将该家庭送回阿富汗方面工作有所进展，并认为提交人之子鉴于年龄很小，对于拘留的体验很可能不会像年龄大些的儿童那样。2014年5月28日，奥斯陆地区法院再次下令将该家庭拘留两周，而不是按照申请拘留四周。

6.4缔约国坚称提交人对特兰那姆中心的描述包含不准确之处，并指出国家警署移民管理局向警察总署负责。除其他外，该中心设有共用的起居室、厨房、庭院和活动区，其设施配备是以满足有孩子家庭的需要为目的。该中心监管委员会2016年的报告当中指出：家庭区组织有序，且人员配备齐全，并不像监狱；室外区域适应儿童的需求。家庭区的工作人员大多为女性，具备与家庭打交道的经验。可以选用的食物和饮料种类足够多，且分量充足。健康服务的范围比大多数在挪威的外国人能获得的健康服务更广泛。在可行范围内，尽可能让有孩子的家庭避免与其他被拘留人员接触。2014年未发生任何骚乱事件。2014年唯一一起自残事件，事涉Ali女士。2017年12月，特兰那姆中心的家庭区迁至新址。2018年3月，挪威议会通过了法律，其中规定仅作为最后手段对儿童实施拘留，并就拘留期限设定了新的限制。

6.5缔约国指出，家庭区超额配备了工作人员，以确保各家庭能得到充分支持。缔约国援引了“公用事业系统”当中涉及各家庭的监管、药品分配和预约问诊事件的日志记录。由于日常安排发生变化，夜间将该家庭锁在屋内的做法仅持续到2014年3月24日。日常安排灵活机动；在很大程度上，是由提交人来决定他们何时想使用庭院或活动厅。护士和一名医生几乎天天照料其需求，评估其子的状况，以确保他总体情况良好。工作人员为该家庭提供了前往该中心之外的游乐场的机会。由警卫陪同前往，因为Ali先生此前曾试图逃跑。国家警署移民管理局与儿童福祉服务机构密切合作，包括在将提交人之子安置进应急之家是否符合其利益的问题上。缔约国无法对有关其子患有恐惧症的病例报告的内容进行评估。该报告是在他们被关押在该中心两年多之后签发的。

6.6缔约国针对就第一阶段拘留而言提交人已用尽国内补救办法之说提出异议，因为提交人未在各法庭上援引当前的诉求。或者说，就其整个拘留期而言，提交人并未用尽《公约》第七条和第十七条的相关补救办法，就2014年4月2日之后的拘留期而言，提交人未用尽第九条和第二十四条相关补救办法。各法院表示出的疑虑(见上文第6.2至第6.3段)表明，对其情况的评估并非是一成不变的。

6.7缔约国指出，博勒加廷高等法院在其2017年5月31日就对另一个家庭实施拘留问题作出的判决当中认为：《移民法》允许将儿童与其父母一道予以拘留；《移民法》中提及《刑事诉讼法》的内容足够明确，可以防止任意拘留；《刑事诉讼法》第184和第187条适用于移民案件。但是，该法院认为继续拘留是不相称的，并认定违反了《欧洲人权公约》第3条、第5条第1款和第8条，《儿童权利公约》第三条和第三十七条(A)和(B)项，以及《挪威宪法》第93条第二句和第94条第二句。据缔约国称，这表明存在着合理的国内补救办法切实有效的可能性。

6.8缔约国指出，最高法院的权限仅限于对高等法院如何处理案件及其法律解释进行审查，包括审查高等法院是否就其相称性评估给出了充分的理由。但是，在高等法院是否适用了《宪法》或《人权法》所规定的人权原则方面，最高法院的权限并不受限制。

6.9缔约国称，特兰那姆中心家庭区的相关情况并未侵犯该家庭根据《公约》第七条享有的权利，因为相关设施以及参与活动、获得医疗服务和接触儿童福祉服务机构的机会足以确保其身心健全和人之尊严(见上文第6.1至第6.5段)。

6.10关于根据《公约》第九条提出的主张，缔约国称对该家庭实施拘留是有法律依据的，并援引了各法院的裁定。《移民法》第106条规定对“外国人”实施拘留，其中包括成人和15岁以下儿童。《移民法》中提及《刑事诉讼法》的内容充分阐明了对有儿童家庭实施拘留的条件。赋予警察和法院的酌处空间非常有限，足可预先排除任意实施拘留的情况。此外，在提交人援引的所有案件当中，欧洲人权法院均未认定存在违反《欧洲人权公约》第5条的情况，而提交人援引的胡萨博报告片段，涉及的是自己申请庇护的儿童。

6.11缔约国称：《公约》并未规定提交人所力推的“如此细致的相称性评估”；各法院就拘留的必要性和相称性给出了合理的理由。人权事务委员会和儿童权利委员会并未完全禁止对儿童实施拘留。虽说任意拘留问题工作组和儿童权利委员会认为仅因父母的移民状况而对儿童实施拘留是不可接受的，但挪威法律并未就此种认定作出规定。家庭只有在不配合回国且切实存在潜逃风险的情况下，就像本案那样，才会被拘留。对于儿童的最大利益，必须作出具体的评估。在提交人之子的情况中，也进行了这样的评估，包括随着时间的推移进行评估。在有充分理由对父母实施拘留的情况下，让父母和孩子待在一起，通常是符合孩子利益的。鉴于国家警署移民管理局和法院认为，考虑到他们的潜逃风险，侵扰性较小的措施力度不够，所以拘留并非不相称举措。拘留的时长虽不合人意，但却是因父母拒绝合作造成的，且定期得到审查。

6.12基于同样的理由，缔约国认为对该家庭实施拘留是合理、必要且相称的，因而并未违反《公约》第十七条和第二十四条。

6.13缔约国认为，《公约》并未明确授权委员会在发生违反《公约》情事时就补救措施提出意见。无论如何，缔约国认为委员会的意见不具法律约束力。若委员会认定侵权，这本身即构成充分赔偿。没有理由背离委员会不明确指定金额的规则。缔约国持有自己的意见，但尽管如此，鉴于提交人之子在特兰那姆中心逗留的情况独特，缔约国决定向其提供70,000挪威克朗的赔偿。缔约国认为，若认定存在侵权，则上述金额可构成充分赔偿。要求修订法律，超出了确保不再发生的规定。而要求确保不再发生，则已是事过境迁(见上文第6.4段)。

提交人对缔约国关于可否受理和实质问题的意见的评论

7.1提交人在2018年6月19日的评论中坚称，所提供的赔偿并不能提供友好解决的基础，也并不构成令人满意的补偿(见上文第3.5段)。考虑到国际先例和挪威先例，所提供的赔偿金额是不够的。

7.2提交人在2018年8月18日的评论中坚称，缔约国主动提议赔偿之举，等于是承认违反了《公约》。提交人对缔约国陈述的事实有异议。提交人坚称，让他们来证明被拘留期间发生了侵权情事是不可能的，应由缔约国来承担证明没有发生侵权情事的责任。缔约国称2014年3月28日至31日特兰那姆中心的“公用事业系统”日志出现故障时遵循了同样的安排。这不过是口说无凭而已。此说不足为信，“公用事业系统”日志也不足为信。他们待在那里期间，牢房的门每晚都是锁着的。没有为其安排医生。缔约国关于护士几乎每天都在满足其需求之说，证明他们在那里的日子是多么艰难。

7.3提交人坚称，博勒加廷高等法院2017年5月31日关于损害赔偿的判决背离了一贯的判例，涉及的是一个就其拘留提出异议但并未成功的家庭。此外，该判决是在Ali一家被递解出境三年后才作出的。

缔约国的补充意见

8.1缔约国在2018年9月19日的补充意见中指出，该国已判给提交人之子70,000挪威克朗。缔约国坚称，提交人援引国际法院在Diallo一案判决中关于举证责任的论证，是站不住脚的，因为与本案中的指控截然不同的是，该案涉及的是程序保障。作为入手点，应由提交人证明其指控。缔约国认为，就该国比对方更有条件获得相关证据之处而言，该国已履行了提供相关证据的义务。

8.2缔约国援引欧洲人权法院在I.F.诉挪威案和I.F.F.诉挪威案中的裁定，事涉一个有个1岁女儿的阿富汗家庭控告自己曾于2016年被拘留在特兰那姆中心。该法院宣布申请不可受理，理由是根据博勒加廷高等法院2017年5月31日的判决，申请人未用尽国内补救办法。

委员会需处理的问题和议事情况

审议可否受理

9.1在审议来文所载的任何请求之前，委员会必须根据其《议事规则》第97条，决定来文是否符合《任择议定书》规定的受理条件。

9.2根据《任择议定书》第五条第二款(子)项的要求，委员会已确定同一事项不在另一国际调查或解决程序审查之中。

9.3委员会注意到缔约国的意见，即鉴于提交人未针对地区法院2014年4月2日、4月30日、5月28日的裁定以及博勒加廷高等法院2014年5月16日的裁定提起上诉，来文因未用尽国内补救办法而不可受理。委员会还注意到，提交人反驳称，鉴于最高法院2014年4月1日作出的判决、最高法院的审查范围有限以及最高法院未明确考虑提交人就其人权所援引的理由，提交人已用尽所有有着合理胜诉可能性的切实有效的国内补救办法。委员会还注意到，提交人认为，博勒加廷高等法院2014年5月16日的判决表明，在此前任何一个时间点上，都不可能有任何上诉机构会认定拘留不合法。委员会注意到，提交人认为，奥斯陆地区法院2014年5月28日的裁定表明，寻求任何进一步补救措施都是徒劳无效的，因为到那时他们已被拘留了八周。但尽管如此，委员会注意到：奥斯陆地区法院在其2014年4月30日和2014年5月14日的裁定中就继续拘留是否相称表达了疑虑；这与缔约国的说法是一致的，即根据最高法院的判例，随着时间的推移，各法院必须对继续拘留的申请进行更严格的评估。因此，委员会认为，最高法院2014年4月1日的判决并未消除任何未来上诉成功的可能性。有鉴于此，委员会认为，鉴于国内法院必须对其案件的事实进行评估，提交人关于追求进一步补救措施徒劳无益之说，并不能免除其追求进一步补救措施之责。委员会得出结论认为，提交人未就其2014年4月2日之后的拘留用尽所有可用的国内补救办法。

9.4委员会注意到缔约国的意见，即提交人未利用《刑事诉讼法》第184条最后一款、《移民法》第106条以及《刑事诉讼法》第185条和第187(a)条最后一款所规定的程序，认为缔约国并未说明上述程序是否本可为提交人提供比其所寻求的补救措施更大的获释可能性。有鉴于上述，委员会认为，就其自2014年3月19日至2014年4月2日的拘留而言，提交人已用尽所有可用的国内补救办法。

9.5委员会注意到缔约国的主张，即提交人未向最高法院援引《公约》第七条、第九条、第十七条第一款和第二十四条，也未向最高法院提出《公约》第七条、第十七条和第二十四条的实质内容。不过，委员会也注意到，提交人在向最高法院提起的上诉当中，提到了其向博勒加廷高等法院提起的上诉，其中援引了《欧洲人权公约》第5条和《儿童权利公约》第三条。因此，委员会确信提交人曾向国内法院提出其根据《公约》第九条和第二十四条所提出主张的实质内容，但不能确定提交人曾提出其根据《公约》第七条和第十七条第一款所提出主张的实质内容。因此，委员会得出结论认为，就根据《公约》第九条和第二十四条所提出的主张而言，《任择议定书》第五条第二款(丑)项并不妨碍委员会审议该来文。因而，委员会宣布，来文根据上述条款就该家庭自2014年3月19日至2014年4月2日的拘留提出了问题，可予受理，并着手审议实质问题。

审议实质问题

10.1委员会根据各当事方提交的所有信息，审议了该来文。

10.2委员会注意到提交人的主张，即根据《公约》第九条，对该家庭实施拘留具有任意性，属非法拘留，因为：挪威剥夺自由方面的法律制度依据不够明确；未提供充分证据证明拘留是必要、相称且侵扰性最小的措施；根据父母的移民状况对儿童实施拘留，永远属非法拘留。

10.3委员会回顾指出，在移民管控程序中实施拘留，本身并不属于任意拘留，但必须证明拘留有合理理由，根据相关情况是合理、必要且相称的，且必须随着拘留期的延长而进行重新评估。委员会还回顾指出：拘留决定必须逐案作出，必须虑及相关因素，不得以适用于一大类情况的强制性规则为依据；必须将较不具侵扰性的能实现相同目的的手段纳入考虑，例如报告义务、担保人或是其他防止潜逃的条件；必须定期对拘留进行重新评估和司法审查。委员会还回顾指出，不应剥夺儿童的自由，除非系作为最后手段，且拘留期适当且尽可能短，在拘留期限和拘留条件方面作为首要考量因素虑及了儿童的最大利益，且虑及了孤身未成年人的极端脆弱性和照料需求。

10.4本案当中，委员会注意到，该家庭是依照奥斯陆地区法院2014年3月19日根据《移民法》第106条第(1)款(b)项下达的一项拘留令实施拘留的。上述条款规定，“若……有具体理由怀疑某外国国民可能逃避执行某项使其不得不离境的行政决定，可对其实施逮捕并还押候审。”委员会还注意到，相关法律制定工作证实了缔约国的意见，即“外国国民”一词意在涵盖成人和儿童。因此，委员会认定，2014年3月19日至2014年4月2日期间对该家庭实施的拘留有国内法依据。

10.5委员会回顾指出，逮捕或拘留可能系依据国内法授权实施，但却依然具有任意性。不应将“任意”概念与“违法”混为一谈，而是必须从更广泛的角度加以解释，包含不适当、不公正、缺乏可预见性和未经正当法律程序等要素，还应虑及合理性、必要性和相称性等要素。在这方面，委员会注意到，奥斯陆地区法院2014年3月19日的裁定和博勒加廷高等法院2014年3月25日的裁定不是基于适用于一大类情况的强制性规则，而是基于根据其案件的具体情况对其拘留进行的评估。这其中包括以下结论：根据法院的评估结果，不适合采用拘留的替代办法，因为有具体理由怀疑该家庭会潜逃：该家庭逾期滞留挪威已有一年多；该家庭在回国方面不配合，包括在此前被送返阿富汗时曾否认其阿富汗国籍。

10.6委员会注意到提交人关于拘留条件的主张(见上文第2.4至第2.7段)。委员会回顾指出，虽说拘留条件主要是在《公约》第七条和第十条之下处理，但如果被拘留人员受到的待遇与其表面上的被拘留目的无关，拘留可能具有任意性。此外，对移民实施拘留的决定，必须考虑到拘留对其身心健康的影响。任何必要的拘留均应在适当、卫生、不具惩罚性的设施中进行，而不是在监狱中进行。根据案卷信息，委员会认为，提交人未能证明其在拘留期间所受待遇与其拘留目的无关。有鉴于上述，委员会不能得出结论认为，该家庭2014年3月19日至2014年4月2日期间遭拘留，侵犯了其根据《公约》第九条享有的权利。

10.7但是，委员会注意到，提交人主张，其子根据《公约》第二十四条享有的权利遭到侵犯。委员会重申，按照《公约》第二十四条第一款的规定，所有儿童均有权享受家庭、社会及国家因其未成年人身份而提供的必需保护措施，而儿童的最大利益原则是上述权利的一项固有内容。委员会注意到《关于原籍国、过境国、目的地国和返回国在具国际移民背景儿童的人权方面的国家义务的保护所有移民工人及其家庭成员权利委员会第4号和儿童权利委员会第23号联合一般性意见(2017年)》，其中规定：鉴于任何剥夺自由行为均蕴含伤害，且移民拘留可能对儿童的身心健康及其发育造成负面影响，以其父母的移民状况为由对任何儿童实施拘留，均构成侵犯儿童权利，有违儿童的最大利益原则；可作为最后手段对儿童实施拘留的原则，不应适用于移民程序。委员会还注意到欧洲人权法院的判例。其中，该法院根据三个因素，即儿童的年龄、拘留儿童的场所是否适宜以及拘留的时长，评估了对儿童实施移民拘留情境中是否存在违反《欧洲人权公约》第3条的情况。委员会还注意到，该法院强调，未成年儿童的特殊脆弱性，是评估当中的一项决定性因素，权重高于该儿童父母的移民状况问题。

10.8本案当中，委员会注意到：提交人声称，特兰那姆中心的设施设备简陋，不适合有幼童的家庭居住一晚以上；提交人还提供信息称，多数家庭在那里居住不超过一晚。委员会还注意到：提交人声称，他们一家住在一间小牢房内，至少在开始时，牢房夜间是上锁的；提交人还声称，其子因警察在场而受到惊吓。委员会还注意到，提交人声称，家庭区未与该中心其他区域分割开来，从而使其子暴露在其他被拘留人员的哭喊声中，包括在他们进入户外区域或是咨询医生或法律顾问之时。委员会注意到，提交人声称，其子的睡眠模式受到干扰，晚上醒着，而儿童福祉服务机构将之归因于白天缺乏活动。委员会还注意到提交人所提供的信息，即挪威心理学协会人权委员会的一份报告认定，特兰那姆中心不适合儿童，因为该中心的运转方式像监狱，心理学家或精神科医生入内机会有限。委员会还注意到，提交人提供信息称，根据上述报告：家庭区不允许进行儿童可能需要的亲密身体接触；从室外游戏区可以看到高高的铁丝网围栏；不允许儿童保留其玩具、毛绒动物玩具或衣物；父母不能管理自己孩子的生活。委员会注意到，提交人提供信息称，充当国家防范酷刑和虐待机制的挪威议会监察员批评该中心不适合儿童，因为附近机场传来的噪音之大，也因为家庭区未从其他区域屏蔽开来，导致儿童接触到骚乱、自残和自杀未遂事件。委员会还注意到，提交人提供信息称，挪威社会教育工作者和社会工作者联盟负责人认为该中心没有为儿童提供令人满意的社会心理环境。委员会进一步注意到，提交人声称：缔约国当局没有试图提出与拘留相比侵扰性较小的其他措施，例如安排一家人入住另一类住处；缔约国当局未妥善考虑其子的处境。在这方面，委员会注意到，司法与公共安全部在2018年6月6日一封信函中通知提交人，该部“主动考虑了Wahaj Ali先生在特兰那姆拘留中心被关押76天的特定情况”，并“决定向其提供70,000挪威克朗的赔偿”。委员会还注意到双方提供的如下信息(见上文第5.6和第6.7段)：博勒加廷高等法院2017年5月31日在一起事涉另一个有孩子的家庭被拘留在特兰那姆中心的案件当中，认为继续拘留该家庭属不相称举措，并认定违反了《欧洲人权公约》第3条、第5条第1款和第8条，《儿童权利公约》第三条和第三十七条(A)和(B)项，以及《挪威宪法》第93和第94条。

10.9委员会注意到，缔约国坚称，由于评估认为该家庭在递解出境令得以执行前存在潜逃风险，将其拘留在特兰那姆中心被视为最后手段。但是，委员会特别注意到前面一段所详述的提交人就特兰那姆中心的性质和条件以及该中心不适合儿童所作的陈述，认为若对所有情况进行了合理的评估，本会阻止像所发生的那样将儿童拘留如此长的时间。因此，委员会认为，缔约国将提交人之子拘留在该中心现有条件下，没有充分考虑可行的拘留替代措施，因而未能将其最大利益作为首要考量因素给予应有的考虑，侵犯了他根据《公约》第二十四条享有的权利。

11.委员会依《任择议定书》第五条第四款行事，认为现有事实显示缔约国侵犯了提交人之子根据《公约》第二十四条享有的权利。

12.根据《公约》第二条第三款(子)项，缔约国有义务给予提交人之子有效的补救。这要求缔约国向《公约》权利受到侵犯的个人提供充分补偿。因此，缔约国有义务除其他外，就侵犯提交人之子的权利向其提供适当的赔偿。缔约国还应防止今后再发生此类侵权情况。

13.缔约国加入《任择议定书》，即已承认委员会有权确定是否存在违反《公约》的情况，而且根据《公约》第二条，缔约国也已承诺确保在其领土内和受其管辖的所有个人享有《公约》承认的权利，并承诺如侵权行为经确定成立，即予以有效且可强制执行的补救。鉴此，委员会希望缔约国在180天内提供资料，说明采取措施落实委员会《意见》的情况。此外，还请缔约国公布本意见，并以缔约国的官方语言广泛传播。

Annex I

Joint opinion of Committee members José Manuel Santos Pais and Imeru Tamerat Yigezu (partially dissenting)

1.We regret not being able to fully agree with the majority of the Committee in the present Views. We consider instead that there was also a violation of the authors’ rights and their son’s rights under article 9 of the Covenant.

2.The authors have exhausted all effective domestic remedies with a reasonable prospect of success as regards the full time of their detention, given the judgments of the Supreme Court of 1 April 2014, the limited scope of the Court’s review and its lack of express consideration for the grounds invoked by the authors concerning their human rights. In our view, unlike the majority’s rather questionable and formal reasoning (para 9.3), not just the detention period from 18 March until 2 April 2014 but the whole period of the detention of the authors and their son should have been considered. There is in fact no evidence that an appeal jurisdiction would have found the detention of the authors illegal at any earlier or later point in time as of April 2014.

3.By a decision dated 19 March 2014, the Oslo District Court ordered the detention of the family until 2 April 2014, considering that it had not left Norway for more than one year after the imparted deadline and that there was a real possibility that the family might abscond. The Court concluded that the family would not return to Afghanistan voluntarily, that there were no alternatives to detention and that the detention was not disproportionate. The family was to be detained at Trandum centre (para 2.2).

4.This decision was upheld by the Borgarting High Court on 25 March 2014 and in twin decisions by the Supreme Court on 1 April 2014 (para 2.3). The Supreme Court stated, in this regard:

“The Supreme Court, sitting in a three-judge formation, observes that its competence is limited to reviewing the case management and the legal interpretation of the High Court: Criminal Procedure Act s 388 (1), finds unanimously that it is clear that the appeal cannot succeed. The appeal is refused pursuant to Criminal Procedure Acts 387 (a) (1).”

No further arguments were provided.

5.The Oslo District Court took subsequent decisions extending the family’s detention on 2 April, 30 April, 14 May (upheld by Borgarting High Court on 16 May) and 28 May 2014. The reasoning in the first decision of 19 March was the same in all subsequent decisions (para 2.3), meaning that the detention of the authors and their son, which lasted for 76 consecutive days, continued to be held proportionate by domestic courts during this whole period.

6.Detention of the authors at Trandum centre profoundly impacted them and their son (paras. 2.4–2.5 and 7.2) and even the State party acknowledges difficulties (paras. 6.1–6.5). This centre was considered unsuitable for children by the Human Rights Committee of the Norwegian Psychological Associations, as well as the Ombudsperson of the Norwegian Parliament and the National Preventive Mechanism. The head of the Norwegian Union of Social Educators and Social Workers argued that detention of children in Norway was unlawful and that the centre provided an unsatisfactory psychosocial environment (para 2.6). Even the authority responsible for the centre, the National Police Immigration Service, acknowledged that the centre was not “an optimal place for a child” (para 2.7).

7.The authors considered that they had no reasonable prospect of success in engaging further remedies for successive prorogations of their detention (para 2.8). In this regard, the State party notes that the Supreme Court has held that courts must assess petitions for continued detention more stringently as time progresses (Rt. 2007, p. 797) (para 4.3). However, domestic courts continued to extend the family’s detention, holding it to be proportionate each time. The Supreme Court’s judgments of 1 April 2014 (see para. 4 above) were among the first in which it pronounced itself on the detention of child migrants. The Supreme Court, however, even two years after the authors and their son had been removed to Pakistan in June 2014, still rejected, in 2016, an appeal brought to it against child detention (involving detention of a family for 8 days as opposed to the detention for 76 days in the present case (para. 4.3)). Moreover, the Supreme Court has never declared detention of families with infant children at Trandum centre to be illegal (paras. 2.8 and 5.1) and considered itself barred from reviewing proportionality and necessity of detention and any new facts (para 5.4), an argument that the State party acknowledges (para. 6.8).

8.Judicial decisions of 30 April and 14 May 2014, even with doubts on the disproportionate nature of the remand, still extended it with the same justification (paras. 6.2–6.3), although courts should have assessed petitions for continued detention more stringently as time progressed (see para. 7 directly above). Moreover, domestic courts have not seriously considered the best interests of the child. Although detention may have been held lawful and proportionate at the outset of the family’s detention, it became arbitrary and disproportionate with its successive prorogations as regards both the authors and their child. Probably for similar reasons to these, by a judgment of 31 May 2017, three years after the removal of the authors, the Borgarting High Court finally declared the detention in 2014 of a family with children at Trandum centre, for a “much shorter period”, to be illegal (para. 5.6).

9.Even the rationale for ordering the family’s detention remains questionable. In its decision of 25 March 2014, Borgarting High Court dismissed alternatives to detention since the authors had not stated where they would reside other than at Trandum centre. Their counsel, however, clearly suggested at the time that they were willing to stay at an asylum centre instead (paras. 3.1 and 3.4).

10.We therefore fail to see which effective remedies with a reasonable prospect of success the authors would need to have pursued in order to challenge the whole duration of the family’s detention. Such detention, from 19 March until 2 June 2014, was therefore arbitrary and disproportionate, entailing a violation of article 9 of the Covenant as regards the whole family.

Annex II

Joint opinion of Committee members Arif Bulkan and Hélène Tigroudja (partially dissenting)

1.We agree with the conclusion of the majority on the violation of article 24 of the Covenant regarding the rights of the authors’ child due to his detention, a violation that was implicitly acknowledged by the State party itself through the ex gratia payment of “compensation” [sic] for his 76-day detention. As clearly stressed by many universal and regional human rights organs, such as the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, the deprivation of the liberty of a child based exclusively on the migratory status of their parents is at odds with the special protection that their condition of childhood demands. In its Advisory Opinion OC-21/14 of 19 August 2014, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights drew the clear distinction between the deprivation of liberty within the context of criminality (under the juvenile criminal system) and detention in migration proceedings. The same standards cannot apply to both and in the latter context, the San José tribunal highlighted that “the deprivation of liberty of children based exclusively on migratory reasons exceeds the requirement of necessity, because this measure is not absolutely essential in order to ensure their appearance at the immigration proceedings or to guarantee the implementation of a deportation order”. Endorsing this position and joint general comment No. 4 of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families/No. 23 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child (2017) on State obligations regarding the human rights of children in the context of international migration in countries of origin, transit, destination and return, the majority of the Committee found a violation of article 24 of the Covenant based on the failure of the State party’s authorities to provide special protection to the authors’ 2-year-old child.

2.Quite oddly, however, the majority of the Committee simultaneously concludes that there was no violation of article 9 of the Covenant (regarding individual liberty) with respect to the authors and their child. This conclusion is factually and legally inconsistent with its finding that the provisions of article 24 had been breached. Factually, it is impossible to respect the best interests of a 2-year-old child in the context of immigration proceedings while ignoring the corresponding necessities of the parental role. There is no way for any State party to respect its obligations in respect of a minor child while detaining his or her parents, as children of such tender years cannot function independently. Accordingly, detention of parents in such a context is arbitrary and a violation of article 9; alternatively, the majority’s position sets an unattainable standard. More critically, this approach is fraught with danger, as it could encourage States parties to separate children from their parents.

3.The majority of the Committee missed one of the main claims of the authors, that is to say, the arbitrariness of the family deprivation of liberty (para. 3.1), and conducted an artificial examination of the situation of the 2-year-old child under article 24 of the Covenant separately from the detention issue under article 9. Our position is that these two claims cannot be examined separately: for the above-mentioned reasons, the 2-year child should under no circumstance have been placed in detention and the State’s representation of the nature of the facilities is irrelevant. The necessity test for depriving the parents of their own liberty should therefore have figured more prominently: it was not sufficient to mention that they had “sufficient grounds”, as indicated by the State migration authorities, to detain the parents (para. 6.11). The special vulnerability of the 2-year-old child should have compelled them to find measures alternative to the family’s deprivation of liberty.

4.In the face of the authors’ claim, the State party’s reliance on the “family unit” principle (para. 6.11) was both cynical and insensitive to evolving notions of children’s rights. The position that children must stay with their parents, including when the parents are deprived of liberty, cannot be used as a shield. As stressed by the European Court of Human Rights in Popov v. France, “whilst mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other’s company constitutes a fundamental element of family life … it cannot be inferred from this that the sole fact that the family unit is maintained necessarily guarantees respect for the right to a family life, particularly where the family is detained”. This means that States cannot use the “family unit” principle to breach the best interest of the child. In addition, the State party’s arguments attest to a concerning disregard for the child’s mental, emotional and physical development. In its submission to the Committee, the State party argues that the child was very young and thus unappreciative of the stressful environment of the detention facilities (see especially para. 6.3). Such reasoning, however, ignores the special vulnerabilities of children, including even very young children. States cannot justify the detention of a family with infants by merely invoking the argument that all that they need is to remain with their parents. Children, including very young children, are extremely fragile and their mental, emotional and physical development should be treated as an important factor when the necessity test for the deprivation of the liberty of the family is being considered.

5.In the present case, the State’s authorities have taken the parents’ migratory situation as the starting point for an analysis of the necessity and proportionality of the family deprivation of liberty. Considering the very young age of the child and his extreme vulnerability, they should instead have taken the child’s rights as the starting point and given it due weight in the decision-making process regarding the family as a whole. As a result of the State’s authorities’ not having done so, we consider that the facts disclose a violation not only of article 24 of the Covenant but also of article 9 with respect to the family.

6.To conclude, we would like to welcome the implicit acknowledgement by the State party of the violation of the authors’ son’s rights, as indicated by its ex gratia payment to the authors. The gravity of the facts and the vulnerability of the child should, however, have led the State party to recognize more clearly and unequivocally the wrongdoings of its authorities and the breaches of the Covenant in order to provide guarantees of non-repetition.

Annex III

Joint opinion of Committee members Furuya Shuichi and Marcia V.J . Kran (dissenting)

1.We have come to a different conclusion from that of the majority of the Committee and would not find a violation of the rights of the authors’ son under article 24 of the Covenant.

2.The issue in this case is whether the authors have demonstrated that the State party failed to adequately protect their son, as required under article 24 of the Covenant, by detaining him in Trandum centre between 19 March 2014 and 2 April 2014.

3.As regards the problems specified by the authors regarding the Trandum centre, their main allegations are that, while detained, (a) they were housed in a small cell which was locked at night; (b) there was a lack of daytime activities for their son who was between 1 and 2 years of age; (c) their son had no access to toys; and (d) he had no access to psychological care. The authors also argued that the State party had not considered less intrusive measures than detention in the Trandum centre.

4.The State party has rebutted each claim, noting that the recommendations of the Norwegian Child Welfare Service were implemented to ensure physical and psychological integrity and human dignity for the authors’ son. After five days, on 24 March 2014, the family’s room was not locked at night, the family was moved to a more suitable room near the children’s playroom and their son was examined by qualified medical personnel so that the cold he had developed could be treated. The State party submits that the Borgarting High Court did consider less intrusive measures on 25 March 2014.

5.The authors and the State party consequently have differing perspectives on whether the authors’ detention at the Trandum centre met the requirements for the detention of a child within the immigration context.

6.As noted in the majority opinion, the period of detention for which all domestic remedies were exhausted was the 15-day period from 19 March 2014 to 2 April 2014. The conditions in the Trandum centre must consequently be measured against the prevailing requirements for the detention of children in the immigration context in March and April 2014. The majority’s reference to heightened standards for detention of children which were later developed holds the State party to a standard that did not exist at the time, which is contrary to the general principle against retroactive application of law.

7.The requirements with respect to detention of children in the immigration context in March and April 2014 can be found in relevant international documents and guidelines from this time period. First, the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee and Committee on the Rights of the Child general comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration specify that the primary consideration for any action involving minors is the best interests of the child. Second, as indicated by the Committee on the Rights of the Child in its concluding observations and decisions on individual complaints and in the reports of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, children should not be separated from their family. Third, under the Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), it is required that all asylum-seekers be treated in a humane and dignified manner. Under the applicable standards it is also specified that detention should not be punitive; family accommodation must be found; appropriate medical treatment must be given; physical recreational activities must be allowed; and the detention of children should be considered a last resort.

8.Applying the 2014 standard to the present case, the evidence demonstrates that the State party undertook an ongoing assessment of the best interests of the child and concluded that he should not be separated from his parents. The State party submitted that their Child Welfare Service recommended that the family’s detention room not be locked, that the family be moved closer to the children’s play area and that the child have access to recreational activities. All of those recommendations were immediately implemented. The Child Welfare Service visited the family at different times during their detention to ensure that the child was receiving adequate treatment. The child was provided with medical services. Moreover, the State party has indicated that less intrusive measures were in fact considered by the Borgarting High Court of 25 March 2014 but that detention at the Trandum centre was determined to be necessary owing to the risk of the family’s absconding, as they had not cooperated with respect to their initial return to Afghanistan. In sum, the evidence before the Committee shows that the State party acted in consonance with the requirements regarding the detention of children in the immigration context that existed in 2014. As these detention standards have since developed, the outcome might have been different had today’s standards been applied to the same set of facts. This communication relates, however, to an earlier period of time.

9.The State party indicated that, owing to problems associated with the Trandum centre, the family unit was moved to a new location in 2017. This later modification along with the 2018 legislative amendments to domestic law on children in an immigration context demonstrates the responsiveness of the State party to evolving standards on child detention in the immigration context.

10.In the light of the foregoing, there is an insufficient basis for finding that the State party did not adequately meet the requirements for child detention in March and April 2014. We are therefore unable to find a violation of article 24 of the Covenant.

Annex IV

Individual opinion of Committee member Duncan Laki Muhumuza (concurring)

1.I am glad to associate with the majority view with the following additions.

2.In my view, there is a violation by the State party under article 24 of the Covenant.

3.The communication concerns the detention of the authors and their son, who was between 1 and 2 years of age at the time, in the Norwegian Police Immigration Detention Centre at Trandum for 76 consecutive days. The authors note that on 18 July 2012, the Directorate of Immigration rejected their asylum application. The Immigration Appeals Board rejected their appeal on 5 February 2013 and ordered them to leave Norway by 13 March 2013. Fearing for their lives in Afghanistan, they appealed this decision but did not receive favourable decisions on 18 and 22 March 2013. On 17 March 2014, the authors were deported to Afghanistan. However, on arrival in Kabul. the authors claimed to be Pakistani nationals, resulting in a refusal by the Afghan authorities to admit them. Upon being returned to Norway on 18 March 2014, the authors and their son were detained at the Police Immigration Detention Centre.

4.The next day, on 19 March 2014, the Oslo District Court ordered the family’s detention until 2 April 2014. The Court considered that because the authors had not left Norway for more than one year after the deadline, this supported a real possibility that they might abscond. This, together with the false claim of Pakistani nationality, led to the unfavourable Court decision. The Court concluded that they would not return to Afghanistan voluntarily and that owing to the risk of their absconding, there were no alternatives to detention. My considered view is that all this should have directed the Court towards deciding in favour of the authors. Indeed, they cannot voluntarily return to Afghanistan where their lives would be at great risk.

5.I therefore opine that the State party was in violation on the following grounds;

The treatment of the infant was cruel and inhumane and the author’s son’s status as a minor was completely ignored. He was treated as an adult and subjected to conditions that were deemed unsuitable even for adults. The child’s rights under the Covenant are not conditional on his parent’s status.

6.The claims by Norway that the authors’ son had access to outdoor playing areas evidence a minimalistic approach to the State party’s fulfilment of its obligations relating to the right of a child. Having separated the child from his parents, the State party, as the primary duty bearer, ought to have found appropriate alternatives to detention in a prison-like facility in order to serve the best interests of the child.

7.In a report by the Human Rights Committee of the Norwegian Psychological Association, it is stated that the facility at Trandum is not suitable for children. It functions like a “prison” and allows access to hardly any psychologists or psychiatrists. It is noted in the report that the family unit does not allow for close physical contact which children may need and that tall barbed wire fences are visible from the outdoor playing area. Children are not allowed to retain their toys, stuffed animals or clothes and parents cannot regulate the lives of their children. The environment is characterized by stress and instability. In December 2015, the Ombudsperson of the Norwegian Parliament and the National Preventive Mechanism against Torture and Ill-Treatment criticized the centre as being unsuitable for children both because of the level of noise coming from the country’s biggest airport nearby and because the family unit is not shielded from other units, which results in the exposure of children to riots, incidents involving self-harm and attempted suicides. The head of the Norwegian Union of Social Educators and Social Workers has argued that detention of children in Norway is unlawful, that the centre does not offer a satisfactory psychosocial environment for children and that current practices breach the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The authors’ son’s sleep pattern became so distorted that he would remain awake at night. The Child Welfare Services attributed this phenomenon to lack of engagement in activities during the day. The authors’ son became increasingly ill, showing signs of aggressive behaviour, particularly after 10 p.m. On one evening when he was in a particularly bad state, the authors requested, unsuccessfully, that they be allowed to go to the playing room and see a doctor, which led them to look for items that they could use to commit suicide. When the Child Welfare Services took them out of the centre so that their son could play, numerous uniformed police officers were in attendance, making them feel like criminals.

8.In my opinion, this treatment of the authors’ son amounts to cruel “punishment” arising from the actions of his parents, which the State party was seeking to remedy, namely, the separation of the child from his parents, contrary to the provisions of article 9 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. This separation was initiated by the State party and direct contact with his parents was not maintained. It was therefore a disproportionate measure taken by the State party in handling the matter because it breached the authors’ rights to have the decision of the courts enforced.

9.There was indeed a failure by the State party to recognize that the child is an independent individual, with unique rights accruing to him by virtue of his status as a minor. The authorities did hardly anything to put forth other, less intrusive measures than detention, such as placing the family in another kind of accommodation or obliging them to report on their whereabouts, a condition that the authors had indicated they would accept.”

10.I would therefore have concluded for a violation of the authors’ rights under article 24 of the Covenant owing to the disproportionate measures taken during pre-removal detention. It is regrettable that the Committee could not find a violation in the face of the overwhelming infractions outlined above. Moreover, considering the situation in Afghanistan, as reported in the mainstream media and in official reports of various monitoring agencies, the Committee ought to take judicial notice that to deport anyone in such circumstances is to put their lives in jeopardy. This must be seen for what it is – a violation of the authors’ human rights.