



**Optional Protocol to the  
Convention against Torture  
and Other Cruel, Inhuman  
or Degrading Treatment  
or Punishment**

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**Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel,  
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment**

**Visit to Hungary undertaken from 21 to 30 March  
2017: recommendations and observations  
addressed to the national preventive mechanism**

**Report of the Subcommittee\*, \*\***

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\* In accordance with article 16 (1) of the Optional Protocol, the present report was transmitted confidentially to the national preventive mechanism on 8 December 2017. On 4 June 2018, the national preventive mechanism requested the Subcommittee to publish the report, in accordance with article 16 (2) of the Optional Protocol.

\*\* The annexes to the present document are being circulated in the language of submission only.



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## **I. Introduction**

1. In accordance with its mandate under articles 11 and 13 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment undertook its first regular visit to Hungary from 21 to 30 March 2017.
2. The Subcommittee was represented by Mari Amos (head of delegation), Arman Danielyan, Nora Sveaass and Aneta Stanchevska. The Subcommittee was assisted by three human rights officers from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations security officers and interpreters.
3. During the visit, the Subcommittee conducted visits to places of deprivation of liberty, including police stations, remand centres, immigration detention centres, secure asylum centres, correctional educational establishments for juveniles, psychiatric and forensic institutions and penitentiary hospitals (see annex I). The Subcommittee held meetings with the relevant domestic authorities, the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, the national preventive mechanism, members of civil society and the Regional Representative for Central Europe of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (annex II).
4. Meetings held with representatives of the national preventive mechanism and of the Civic Consultative Body provided the Subcommittee with the opportunity to discuss the national preventive mechanism's mandate and working methods and to explore ways to increase its effectiveness. In order to better understand how the mechanism works in practice, the Subcommittee also visited a place of deprivation of liberty chosen by the members of the mechanism. The visit was led by those representatives, with the members of the Subcommittee acting as observers.
5. At the conclusion of the visit, the delegation presented its confidential preliminary observations orally to the domestic authorities. The Subcommittee will send a separate confidential report to the domestic authorities, in which it will make recommendations to the State party.
6. The present report sets out the observations and recommendations of the Subcommittee addressed to the national preventive mechanism of Hungary. The recommendations are made in accordance with the Subcommittee's mandate to offer training and technical assistance and to advise and assist the mechanism, in accordance with article 11 (b) (ii) and (iii) of the Optional Protocol. The present report remains confidential unless the mechanism decides to make it public, in accordance with article 16 (2) of the Optional Protocol.
7. The Subcommittee draws the attention of the national preventive mechanism to the Special Fund established pursuant to article 26 of the Optional Protocol. Recommendations contained in visit reports that have been made public may form the basis of an application for funding for specific projects through the Special Fund, in accordance with its rules.
8. The Subcommittee wishes to express its gratitude to the national preventive mechanism of Hungary for its assistance and cooperation during the visit.

## **II. National preventive mechanism**

9. Hungary acceded to the Optional Protocol in 2012 with a declaration under article 24, postponing the establishment of its national preventive mechanism for three years. In October 2012, the Subcommittee was notified that, as of January 2015, the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights would perform the function of national preventive mechanism. The Commissioner was confirmed in the role of official national preventive mechanism of Hungary under chapter III/A of Act CXI of 2011, with effect as of January 2015.

10. Since its establishment in 2015, the national preventive mechanism has carried out 15 visits to places of deprivation of liberty.<sup>1</sup> Due to the limited targeted budgetary support available, the Commissioner had to allocate its own resources to preparatory work concerning the performance of the national preventive mechanism's tasks. The funds concerned were made available by the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights through the transformation and reorganization of office operations.<sup>2</sup>

11. The Subcommittee was informed that, compared to 2015, the budget of the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights has increased. However, there are no explicit provisions in the regulating acts regarding the earmarking of funding for the national preventive mechanism. The Subcommittee highlights the fact that the lack of budgetary independence negatively affects the independent functioning of the mechanism.

12. The Civic Consultative Body was established in 2014 for a period of three years to provide advice to the national preventive mechanism. It is composed of representatives of independent organizations, which are either invited to participate, as was the case for the Hungarian Medical Chamber, the Hungarian Psychiatric Association, the Hungarian Dietetic Association and the Hungarian Bar Association, or selected as a result of a public call for interest, as was the case for the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, Menedék – Hungarian Association for Migrants and Validity (formerly the Mental Disability Advocacy Centre). The Civic Consultative Body provides comments and suggestions on the content of the mechanism's annual schedule of visits, inspection priorities, working methods, reports and other publications and the training plan for the mechanism's members.<sup>3</sup>

13. The Subcommittee welcomes the fact that the national preventive mechanism has been operational for over a year, has conducted several visits to places of deprivation of liberty in Hungary and has published its first annual report.

### **III. Recommendations to the national preventive mechanism**

#### **A. Recommendations relating to legal, institutional and structural issues**

##### **1. Structure and independence**

14. As a general observation, the Subcommittee notes that the national preventive mechanism does not have an identity distinct from that of the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, not only with respect to its legal framework but also to its institutional framework and guarantees of independence. The Subcommittee is particularly concerned at the lack of functional independence of the mechanism within the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights. While the Optional Protocol does not provide for a mechanism structure that is compliant with its provisions, it is imperative that the mechanism should be able to carry out its mandate in accordance with the principles of the Optional Protocol, as reflected in the Subcommittee's guidelines on national preventive mechanisms.

15. Even though the decision concerning the institutional format of the national preventive mechanism is left to States parties' discretion, it is imperative that the legal acts regulating the work of the mechanism should comply fully with the Optional Protocol, the Subcommittee's guidelines on national preventive mechanisms, the principles relating to the status of national institutions (the Paris Principles) and the compilation of advice provided by the Subcommittee in response to requests from national preventive mechanisms (see CAT/C/57/4, annex).

16. The Subcommittee urges the national preventive mechanism, in close cooperation with the State party, to review the legal framework in which the mechanism operates and

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<sup>1</sup> Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, *Comprehensive Annual Report of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights on the Activities of the OPCAT National Preventive Mechanism in 2015* (Budapest, May 2016), p. 35, sect. 8.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16, sect. 2.4.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20, sect. 4.2.

bring it into full conformity with all relevant international norms and guidelines, with a view to resolving any existing or potential issues that may prevent the mechanism from carrying out its mandate effectively. The practical needs and the operability of the mechanism must be also taken into account.

**17. The Subcommittee recommends that the national preventive mechanism be enabled, by means of legislation, to effectively perform its core functions, as stipulated by the Optional Protocol.**

**18. The Subcommittee also recommends that the national preventive mechanism carry out a mapping exercise to assess the range of activities it ought to undertake in accordance with the Optional Protocol, the Paris Principles, the Subcommittee's guidelines on national preventive mechanisms and the analytical assessment tool for national preventive mechanisms (see CAT/OP/1/Rev.1), and compare it to the current structure and activities of the mechanism.**

**19. The Subcommittee further recommends that the national preventive mechanism carry out a review of the existing legal acts governing its functioning, in order to have a full overview of all those aspects that must be revised to enable the mechanism to carry out its mandate effectively. The mechanism must be involved in the drafting of any resulting amendments, in close cooperation with the Ministry of Justice. Furthermore, the mechanism, together with the authorities, must work proactively to find ways to increase its efficiency and independence.**

## **2. Human and financial resources**

20. According to the provisions of Act CXLIII of 2011, the work of the national preventive mechanism is to be performed by at least 11 staff members of the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights.<sup>4</sup> At the time of the Subcommittee's visit, the mechanism was composed of nine staff members: two medical positions were currently vacant.

21. The Subcommittee is concerned that only nine staff members have been assigned to perform tasks related to the national prevention mechanism's mandate, a situation that affects the ability of the mechanism to fully carry out its mandate under the Optional Protocol. The goal of an effective system of regular visits to all the places of deprivation of liberty located in the State party cannot be achieved if human resources are limited and medical positions are left vacant. Moreover, the mechanism should have full operational autonomy with regard to recruitment of its staff, including medical staff, which is not currently the case. According to representatives of the mechanism, there were legal caveats hindering the recruitment of medical personnel in that all mechanism staff had to be civil servants, whereas, in Hungary, doctors could not be civil servants.

22. The Subcommittee is also concerned that a lack of financial resources presents a major obstacle to the effective and efficient functioning of the national preventive mechanism. Although the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights was designated as the national preventive mechanism of Hungary, it has not subsequently been allocated sufficient resources to enable it to perform this additional role. The Subcommittee is further concerned that the failure to allocate the necessary resources seems to be due to the fact that the Hungarian authorities do not consider that the mechanism requires additional support to carry out its mandate effectively. This is a misconception that the mechanism needs to address urgently.

23. The Subcommittee recalls that any assessment of the financial requirements of the national preventive mechanism must take into account all the mechanism's mandated activities under the Optional Protocol, including, where necessary, the provision of interpretation in order to communicate with detained migrants.

**24. Recalling that, under article 18 (3) of the Optional Protocol, States parties have an obligation to make available the necessary resources for the functioning of the national preventive mechanisms, the Subcommittee reiterates that the national**

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<sup>4</sup> See Act CXI of 2011 on the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, chap. III/A, sect. 39 (D) (3).

preventive mechanism should be provided with sufficient budgetary funding to enable it to carry out all its mandated tasks and should be granted institutional autonomy regarding the use of its resources. The funding should be provided through a separate line in the national annual budget referring specifically to the national preventive mechanism (see CAT/C/57/4 and Corr.1, annex, sect. III) and not through the general budget of the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights. This funding should be sufficient to allow the mechanism to carry out its programme of visits, engage the services of external experts as and when appropriate, increase its human resources and regularly access training, in accordance with its own workplan.

25. In order to ensure its functional and operational independence, the national preventive mechanism must enter into a constructive dialogue with the relevant domestic authorities designed to ascertain the mechanism's requirements with regard to the fulfilment of its mandate in accordance with the provisions of the Optional Protocol.

26. The Subcommittee recommends that the national preventive mechanism evaluate its financial needs in order to more effectively fulfil its mandate under the Optional Protocol and that, as a matter of priority, it submit proposals concerning those needs to the domestic authorities. Based on that evaluation, concrete plans for the mechanism's development and future activities could be prepared and a constructive dialogue with the domestic authorities could be established concerning concrete budget proposals and the allocation of sufficient resources to the mechanism through a separate budget line.

### 3. Cooperation with the Civic Consultative Body

27. The Subcommittee welcomes the cooperation established between the national preventive mechanism and civil society organizations. Given that the mechanism has only limited resources, it does not have the capacity to cover all of the numerous places of deprivation of liberty located in the State party and to undertake all the other activities provided for under its mandate. Improved communication and coordination between the mechanism and the Civic Consultative Body are essential if the two entities are to work together efficiently.

28. In this connection the Subcommittee urges the mechanism to improve information-sharing through regular meetings and other channels of communication and to adopt clearly defined working methods. It is recommended that the mechanism and the Civic Consultative Body jointly establish a clear framework for cooperation and mutual support.

29. The Subcommittee recommends that the national preventive mechanism engage more directly and independently with civil society organizations, including, at a minimum, through their increased participation in mechanism visits, internal training, outreach activities, report-writing and dialogue with the domestic authorities.

30. The Subcommittee recommends that the national preventive mechanism follow up the concrete proposals put forward during the mechanism's meeting with the Civic Consultative Body on 22 March 2017. Those proposals include: involving civil society experts in detention-related activities; creating a database of experts and including experts in monitoring teams based on their experience; increasing the number of visits to 25; involving the Civic Consultative Body in the process of selecting facilities for visits (one third to be selected by the Civic Consultative Body); discussing the mechanism's report with the Body at least two weeks prior to its publication; following up the mechanism's recommendations in cooperation with the Body; consulting with the Body about the types of facilities to be visited and the methodology to be employed; and adopting terms of reference concerning cooperation with the Body, including regarding the chairing and the venue of its meetings with the Body.

31. In addition, the Subcommittee recommends that the national preventive mechanism ensure that standard operating procedures are uniformly applied by all its staff and members of the Civic Consultative Body, with a view to ensuring consistency of working methods and knowledge-sharing. Adequate training for all persons

participating in mechanism visits to places of deprivation of liberty, including external experts, is essential and should be put in place, including through the development of handbooks and assistance from international partners.

32. While noting the professionalism of some of the national preventive mechanism members when conducting interviews with detainees, the Subcommittee recommends that all participants in visits carried out by the mechanism undergo regular training, including in interview techniques, visiting procedures and the detection of signs and risks of torture and ill-treatment. Working methods and a comprehensive visiting methodology should be developed to highlight systemic institutional challenges, including those affecting vulnerable populations in places of deprivation of liberty. Experienced mechanism members could provide new staff and external experts with training in interviewing techniques.

## **B. Recommendations on methodological issues relating to visits**

### **1. Workplan, reporting and follow-up**

33. The national preventive mechanism plans its visiting activities on a yearly basis, taking into account the different types and geographical locations of places of deprivation of liberty and the categories of persons deprived of liberty, as well as thematic targets for the year in question. However, the Subcommittee observed that the mechanism mainly focuses on detention monitoring activities.

34. **The Subcommittee recommends that the national preventive mechanism focus not only on visiting places of deprivation of liberty but also on other preventive activities. The Subcommittee also recommends that the mechanism develop an annual workplan which should include all preventive activities, including commenting on draft legislation and awareness-raising and training activities, in accordance with article 19 of the Optional Protocol and paragraph 9 of the analytical assessment tool for national preventive mechanisms.**

35. **With a view to properly fulfilling its mandate under the Optional Protocol in various areas, with its preventive role in mind, the national preventive mechanism is advised to analyse its activities in the light of relevant international instruments. Such an exercise can be done by using the Subcommittee's Analytical assessment tool for national preventive mechanisms and the matrix based thereon. Once the mechanism has a clear overview of the areas that are currently insufficiently covered, together with its partners, it can prepare an appropriate workplan for immediate implementation and future development.**

36. Following visits, the members of the visiting delegation prepare partial reports that are summarized by the head of delegation. Visit reports are subsequently submitted to the respective authorities, as well as to the head of the place of deprivation of liberty concerned, the addressees of the recommendations, the members of the Civic Consultative Body and the Hungarian member of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The visit reports are subsequently made available to the public in Hungarian and, where funding allows, translated into English.

37. The Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights publishes its annual reports and the national preventive mechanism visit reports on the Commissioner's website. However, the Subcommittee was informed that the process of drafting and publishing the mechanism's reports could be lengthy, owing to a desire to ensure a high-quality and comprehensive end product. The Subcommittee highlights that extended delays in drafting and publication of visit reports can have a negative impact on the timely follow-up to the visit report recommendations and, eventually, on the overall conditions of detention of persons deprived of their liberty.

38. While the Subcommittee notes that visit reports are prepared and submitted to the authorities, it also notes that there is no clear policy concerning a systematic follow-up and dialogue procedure.

39. **Further to making the annual report public, pursuant to article 23 of the Optional Protocol, the Subcommittee recommends that it should be discussed in the parliament in open session and widely disseminated. The annual report of the national preventive mechanism should be distinct from that of the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights.**

40. **The Subcommittee also recommends that the national preventive mechanism enter into a continuous dialogue with the relevant public and other authorities, as well as with other addressees of the recommendations, with a view to ensuring the implementation of the mechanism's recommendations. Following the transmittal of the report, the mechanism should develop a strategy for following up the recommendations and using the report as a platform for dialogue with the authorities of the places of deprivation of liberty visited and with the respective public or other authorities.**

41. **The Subcommittee further recommends that the mechanism meet with the relevant public authorities directly to discuss the implementation of its recommendations, in accordance with article 22 of the Optional Protocol. The mechanism should disseminate its annual reports, including by transmitting them to the Subcommittee, for the purposes set out in the Optional Protocol.**

## **2. Recommendations on visit methodology**

42. During the joint visit to Budapest Remand Centre (Unit I), the Subcommittee was pleased to note that national preventive mechanism members enjoyed full access to all facilities within the prison and to all information concerning the number of detainees and conditions of detention.

43. *Preparations for visits:* Given that the year 2017 is dedicated to food and nutrition in places of deprivation of liberty, the national preventive mechanism should collect information regarding the topic from the appropriate domestic supervisory bodies prior to conducting visits. This would enable the experts to better understand the situation in the facilities to be visited and to ensure that appropriate preparations are made for visits. Should the mechanism members require additional data from the administration on places of deprivation of liberty, they can provide the authorities with a list of those data at the beginning of the visit, so that they are ready for collection by the end of the visit or for transmission via email. Such an approach would leave mechanism members free to carry out actual monitoring activities.

44. *Interviews:* The Subcommittee observed that, during the joint visit, the national preventive mechanism members often introduced themselves as representatives of the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, because that body is more widely recognized and better known. This may lead to confusion among the detaining authorities and the detainees regarding the separate mandates of the two institutions. The Subcommittee also noted that the mechanism members were not clearly identified as such and that some of them failed to systematically introduce themselves to detainees as representatives of the national preventive mechanism and to explicitly explain their mandate (including making a clear distinction between the activities of the mechanism and those of the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights). In addition, a number of exchanges of information with detainees were conducted in the presence, or within earshot of, detention officers.

45. **The Subcommittee recommends that, when introducing themselves to interviewees, members of the national preventive mechanism, particularly the external experts, state their name and the position they occupy within the mechanism. The Subcommittee is of the view that an appropriate and complete introduction builds trust with the interviewees and facilitates communication and information-sharing. In addition, the members of the visiting team should be clearly identified as national preventive mechanism members, for example, by wearing badges or vests, and should provide information leaflets to the authorities and the detainees.**

46. *Confidentiality and risk of reprisals:* The Subcommittee reiterates that the location where individual interviews take place should be carefully chosen to ensure that the contents of the interview remain confidential and that the "do no harm" principle is applied, without exception. The interviewers should indicate that the interviewees can report any reprisals



they may face subsequent to the visit and encourage them to do so. If necessary, follow-up visits should be conducted. The Subcommittee underlines the need to always seek ways to protect those interviewed from possible reprisals, even where there appears to be little risk. The Subcommittee noted that, at the final debriefing at the end of the joint visit, the mechanism members did not inform the authorities of the place of detention concerned that any form of intimidation or reprisal against persons deprived of their liberty constituted a violation of the State party's obligation under article 13 of the Convention against Torture and article 20 of the Optional Protocol.

**47. The Subcommittee recommends that the national preventive mechanism always consider that detainees interviewed during visits face a risk of intimidation, sanctions or reprisals, and therefore take steps to address that risk. In addition to taking the above-mentioned precautions, the mechanism should clearly inform the authorities that reprisals of any kind are unacceptable, will be reported and will be followed up by the mechanism. This should be done with the clear intention of ensuring that those responsible for such reprisals are promptly investigated and, if found guilty, appropriately sanctioned. The mechanism should also, inter alia, undertake preventive follow-up visits.**

### **3. Visibility and awareness**

48. The Subcommittee observed that the national preventive mechanism lacked visibility among the authorities and among persons deprived of their liberty, a situation that may have a detrimental effect on the mechanism's efficiency and effectiveness. In many places of deprivation of liberty, neither the administration nor the detainees were aware of the mechanism, its role or its function. Moreover, the Subcommittee concluded that some officials in places of deprivation of liberty were not familiar with the recommendations made by the mechanism following visits to their facilities.

**49. The Subcommittee recommends increasing the visibility of the national preventive mechanism, including through activities that raise awareness of the Optional Protocol and of the mechanism's mandate. The mechanism should undertake activities to increase the awareness of the general public, and, in particular, persons deprived of their liberty, of its mission and its mandate. In line with article 19 of the Optional Protocol, the mechanism should engage in legislative processes and advocacy, in order to increase its overall visibility. The Subcommittee also recommends that the mechanism engage in outreach activities and other events, as appropriate.**

50. The Subcommittee further recommends preparing and distributing additional materials on the national preventive mechanism's mandate and activities to staff and detainees in places of deprivation of liberty and to wider civil society, in order to increase the mechanism's visibility and improve understanding of its mandate.

## **IV. Final recommendations**

51. In conclusion, the Subcommittee is aware that the national preventive mechanism of Hungary faces complex challenges regarding its legal, institutional and structural framework. It recommends that the mechanism adopt a proactive approach and submit the following elements to the authorities: a proposal concerning the revision of the mechanism's legal, institutional and structural framework, including within the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights; and proposals concerning ways of securing the necessary financial resources, further to a thorough internal evaluation of the level of financial resources required to fulfil the mechanism's mandate under the Optional Protocol.

52. In the light of the low level of human and financial resources available to the national preventive mechanism, the Subcommittee also recommends that the mechanism increase cooperation with national preventive mechanisms in other States, in order to strengthen its capacities, share information and practices and develop its working methods with a view to improving its ability to carry out its mandate under the Optional Protocol.

53. **The Subcommittee further recommends that the national preventive mechanism continue to develop its capacity through increased cooperation with the Subcommittee, as well as through engagement with other national preventive mechanisms and appropriate national preventive mechanism networks.**

54. The Subcommittee regards its visit and the present report as the beginning of a constructive dialogue with the national preventive mechanism of Hungary. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights stands ready to provide technical assistance and advice to the mechanism to strengthen its capacity to prevent torture and ill-treatment in all places of deprivation of liberty in the State party and to make the common goal of prevention a reality.

55. The Subcommittee recalls that the State party has an obligation to prevent torture and that the likelihood of that obligation being met can only be greatly increased by the existence of an effective national preventive mechanism. The Subcommittee encourages the mechanism to review and strengthen its working methods and to avail itself of training courses to improve its ability to discharge its responsibilities under the Optional Protocol, including through the assistance of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights concerning follow-up to the present recommendations.

56. The Subcommittee also encourages the mechanism to transmit its annual reports to the Subcommittee and reaffirms its readiness to help to achieve the shared aims of preventing torture and ill-treatment and ensuring that commitments are translated into action.

57. **The Subcommittee recommends that the national preventive mechanism make the present report public and requests that it be notified of the mechanism's decision in this regard.**

## Annex I

### List of places of deprivation of liberty visited by the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture

Aszód Correctional Educational Institution for Juveniles  
Budapest Correctional Educational Institution for Juveniles  
Debrecen Correctional Educational Institution for Juveniles  
Rákospalota Correctional Educational Institution and Childcare Home for Girls and Young Mothers

Békéscaba Asylum Detention Centre  
Kiskunhalas Immigration Detention Centre  
Niyarbator Secure Asylum Centre  
Niyarbator Immigration Detention Centre  
Rözske Transit Zone  
Tompá Transit Zone

Budapest High and Medium Security Prison  
Budapest Remand Centre (Units II and III)  
Hajdú-Bihar County Remand Centre (Debrecen)  
Szeged Strict and Medium Regime Prison (Units I and II)  
Tököl National Prison

Budapest Police Station (Központi Fogda)  
Budapest District Police Station (BRFK III)  
Budapest District Police Station (BRFK VII)  
Budapest District Police Station (BRFK VIII)  
Budapest District Police Station (BRFK IX)

Debrecen Police Station (Debreceni Rendőrkapitányság)  
Debrecen Police Station (Debreceni Rendőrkapitányság Fogda – és Kísérőőri Alosztály)  
Gyöngyös Police Station (Gyöngyösi Rendőrkapitányság)  
Szeged Police Station (Szegedi Rendőrkapitányság)

Forensic Psychiatric and Mental Health Institution (IMEI), Budapest  
Tököl Central Penitentiary Hospital

#### Joint visit with the national preventive mechanism

Budapest Remand Centre (Unit I)

## Annex II

### List of officials and other persons with whom the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture met

#### Ministry of the Interior

Mátyás Hegyaljai, Deputy State Secretary for European Union Affairs and International Relations

Tímea Erzsébet Lehoczki, Deputy Head of Department of European Cooperation

Gábor Tóthi, Head of Unit (Department of European Cooperation)

János Iványi, Legal Expert (Department of European Cooperation)

#### National Police Headquarters

Tibor Lakatos, Colonel

László Balázs, Colonel

Csaba Borsas, Lieutenant-Colonel

Emese Kertész, Lieutenant-Colonel

#### Hungarian Prison Service (headquarters)

Róbert Bogotyán, Lieutenant-Colonel

Gergely Vattay, Head of Department of Legal Issues

#### Immigration and Asylum Office

Gyula Mikolicz

Katalin Miklós

#### Independent Police Complaints Board

Nóra Fráterné Ferenczy

Dóra Deák-Kondákor

#### Ministry of Justice

Anikó Raisz, Political Adviser

Zoltán Tallódi, Deputy Head of Department of Human Rights

Gergely Kunyák, Prosecutor, Department of Criminal Procedure

Veronika Pázsit, Legal Expert, Department of Criminal Law

Balázs Belovics, Legislator, Department of Criminal Law

#### Office of the Prosecutor General of Hungary

András Szűcs, Prosecutor, Head of Unit

#### Central Investigative-Prosecutor's Office

Rolland Waltner, Deputy Prosecutor General

Zoltán Margl, Deputy Prosecutor General

#### Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Tamás Kuntár, Head of Department of International Organizations

Ágnes Hegyesi, Deputy Head of Department of International Organizations

Marianna Klaudia Lévai, human rights expert, Department of International Organizations

#### Ministry of Human Capacities

Csilla Lantai, Deputy Head of Department

Éva Bódy, Deputy Head of Department

Éva Dr Gellénné dr Lukács, Adviser

Edina Molnár, Social Expert

Judit Mária Tóth, Health Care Expert

#### Representatives of the national parliament

Márk Ádám Janó

Csaba Gergely Tamás

Szilvia Madarasi

Mónika Pozsgai

**National preventive mechanism**

Laszlo Szekely, Commissioner for Fundamental Rights

Gergely Fliegauf, Head of the Department for the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Katalin Haraszti, Deputy Head of the Department for the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Staff of the Department for the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and members of the Civic Consultative Body

**United Nations**

Montserrat Feixas Vihe, Regional Representative for Central Europe of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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