人权事务委员会

委员会根据《任择议定书》第五条第4款通过的关于第2807/2016号来文的意见* *****

来文提交人：	Miriana Hebbadj(由律师Roger Kallas代理)
据称受害人：	提交人
所涉缔约国：	法国
来文日期：	2016年3月3日(首次提交)
参考文件：	根据委员会议事规则第97条作出的决定，已于2016年3月14日转交缔约国(未以文件形式印发)
意见通过日期：	2018年7月17日
事由：	宗教自由权；对某一宗教及其信徒的歧视性待遇
程序性问题：	可否受理――由另一国际调查或解决程序审查；用尽国内补救办法；
实质性问题：	宗教或信仰自由；不歧视
《公约》条款：	第十八和第二十六条
《任择议定书》条款：	第五条第2款(子)项和(丑)项

1.1来文提交人是Miriana Hebbadj, 系法国国民，1974年出生。提交人声称，缔约国侵犯了她根据《公约》第十八条和第二十六条享有的权利。《任择议定书》于1984年5月17日对缔约国生效。提交人由律师代理。

1.22017年9月22日，委员会根据议事规则第97条第3款，通过新来文和临时措施特别报告员行事，告知缔约国及提交人，委员会决定一并审查来文可否受理和实质问题。

提交人陈述的事实

2.1提交人是穆斯林，穿戴尼卡布(一种全脸面纱)。2011年11月21日，提交人在南特街头被拦下接受身份检查，当时她头戴面纱。提交人随后被起诉，并被判犯有在公共场所穿着意图遮盖面部的衣物的轻罪。

2.2提交人于2012年3月26日被南特社区法院定罪，并被判处150欧元罚金，而这是2010年10月11日第2010-1192号法(下称“该法”)规定的对所涉罪行的最高处罚。该法第1条规定，任何人不得在公共场所穿着任何意图遮盖面部的衣物。关于适用范围的该法第2条规定，公共场所包括公共大道和向公众开放或用于公共服务的场所。该条还规定，禁令不适用于法律规定或批准的衣物，或出于健康原因或职业理由而穿着的衣物，或属于体育、艺术或传统节日或活动的衣物。

2.3该法第3条对此类违法行为规定了下列处罚：等同于第二类罪行的罚金以及/或者强制参加公民课程。该法还规定了迫使他人遮盖面部这一更为严重的罪行(该罪行已列入《刑法典》第225-4-10条)，规定任何人以性别为由，通过威胁、暴力、胁迫或滥用职权或权力，迫使一人或多人遮盖面部的，应处以一年监禁及30,000欧元罚金。如对未成年人实施此类罪行，处罚将增加至两年监禁和60,000欧元罚金。

2.4提交人根据《公约》第十八条，对禁止在公共场所遮盖面部的规定提出质疑，因为该规定剥夺了希望佩戴全脸面纱的妇女这样做的可能性。

2.5至于提交人所采取的步骤，由于社区法院法官的裁决不可上诉，提交人向最高法院刑事庭提出了复审申请。提交人主张，该法禁止在公共场所穿着意图遮盖面部的衣物，并为她被定罪的违法行为确立了法律依据，这违反了《保护人权与基本自由公约》(《欧洲人权公约》)第9条，该条保护表明个人宗教的权利。关于实质问题，提交人还声称，该法具有歧视性，提交人请最高法院裁断该法是否“因歧视穆斯林宗教的少数习俗而损害了多元主义”。

2.6最高法院刑事庭在2013年4月3日的一项裁定中驳回了该申请，理由是“该理由涉及违反《欧洲人权公约》的情况，由于没有提交给初审法官，且包含补充的实情证据，该理由为新理由，因此不可受理”。这一裁定不可上诉。提交人认为，她已经用尽所有可用的国内补救办法。

2.7提交人指出，她在南特社区法院的程序中没有得到律师协助；审理过程迅速，且只有一位独任法官，而这种独任法官通常甚至不是职业法官；而且该程序不得上诉，使她没有机会就其宗教自由和该法的歧视性质进行论证。

2.8提交人补充说，最高法院认为“该理由涉及违反《欧洲人权公约》的情况，由于没有提交给初审法官，且包含补充的实情证据，该理由为新理由，因此不可受理”，错误地适用了《民事诉讼法》第619条，该条规定，最高法院不受理新的理由。尽管如此，除非另有规定，下列事项可首次提出：(a) 纯粹的法律理由；(b) 基于受质疑的裁定的理由。

2.9据提交人称，依据所援引的理由，即不符合某部法律构成“纯粹的法律理由”，提交人就禁止佩戴全脸面纱向最高法院提出的上诉完全可以受理，尽管确实是新的理由。提交人援引了合宪性事后审查的例子；自2010年以来，法律允许在向最高法院提出上诉时首次提出这一问题。提交人补充说，抽象地评估某部法律的合宪性，本质上是一个“纯粹的法律”问题，不考虑特定案件的具体情况。据提交人称，如果以同样的客观程度评估某部国内法是否符合某项条约义务，情况也是如此。

2.10因此，提交人吁请委员会认定她的申诉不能被视为不可受理，因为向最高法院援引的理由并不构成补充的实情和法律证据，而是一个“纯粹的法律”理由。

2.112013年6月24日，提交人向欧洲人权法院提出申诉，吁请该法院裁定存在违反《欧洲人权公约》第6条第1款和第9条的情况。欧洲人权法院于2014年8月21日至9月4日举行了由独任法官组成的会议，宣布她的申诉不可受理，理由是不符合《欧洲人权公约》第34至第35条规定的受理条件。

申诉

3.1据提交人称，禁止在公共场所遮盖面部以及提交人因佩戴面纱而被定罪侵犯了她根据《公约》第十八条和第二十六条享有的权利。

3.2关于第十八条，穿戴面纱或罩袍相当于穿戴一部分穆斯林信徒的习俗服装。这是一种出于宗教信仰动机的行为。因此，此行为涉及宗教的信守和崇奉，而表明宗教的自由受到《公约》第十八条的保障，尽管事实上穿戴面纱或罩袍并不是所有穆斯林信徒都需遵守的共同宗教要求。提交人提及委员会第22号一般性意见(1993年)，其中指出，对宗教或信仰的信守和崇奉可能不仅包括典礼，也包括遵守饮食规定、穿戴不同的服饰或头巾等习惯。穿戴面纱或罩袍相当于穿戴一部分穆斯林信徒的习俗服装，这是一种出于宗教信仰动机的行为，因此是信守和崇奉宗教的一部分，而表明宗教的自由受到《公约》第十八条的保障。

3.3据提交人称，缔约国干涉佩戴全脸面纱的少数穆斯林妇女的宗教自由，这是毫无争议的(据研究这一问题的议会委员会称，涉及的妇女不到2,000人)。在这方面，提交人回顾法国宪法委员会在其2010年10月7日的决定中对礼拜场所提出的保留：“在不过分损害1789年《人权宣言》第10条的情况下，在公共场所遮盖面部的禁令不能限制在向公众开放的礼拜场所行使宗教自由”。据提交人称，与之相反的是，应当说她在所有其他公共场所行使宗教自由受到立法机构的限制。

3.4提交人提及委员会的判例，特别是委员会在Ranjit Singh诉法国案中的意见，其中委员会认定，在这起案件中，一人为延长居留证而被拍摄免冠照片，这干涉了宗教自由的行使，违反了第十八条。据提交人称，禁止在公共场所佩戴全脸面纱是一种类似但更恶劣的对宗教自由的干涉，因为她被迫在任何时候都不戴全脸面纱。

3.5提交人补充说，适用于第十八条的限制并非基于可允许的理由，如《公约》第十八条第三款规定的理由。虽然这些限制是由法律规定的，但对该法的目的既无必要，也不相称。首先，立法机构没有明确界定这一目的。该法没有目的声明，也没有提供有关其法律依据的信息；该法甚至没有提到2010年5月11日的议会决议，国民议会在该决议中表示，佩戴全脸面纱违反法兰西共和国的原则。简单回顾该法的起源就可以看出，该法完全是出于一种政治愿望，将佩戴全脸面纱作为原则问题加以禁止；因此，该法不具有《公约》第十八条第三款含义所指的正当目的。缺乏正当目的削弱了该法确实有必要存在的论证。

3.6提交人补充说，即使确立了此类目的，这种限制也不可能被认为是必要和相称的。缔约国提出的论点是，该法致力于两个主要目标，即：男女平等和保护公共秩序。然而，这些目标不能成为侵犯表明个人宗教的权利的理由。

3.7第一，男女平等的目标本身并不能与第十八条第三款规定的任何目的产生关联。委员会在其第22号一般性意见(1993年)(第8段)中指出，不得以第三款未规定的理由施加限制。提交人补充说，强迫希望佩戴全脸面纱的妇女在公共场所摘下面纱，构成了对妇女的着装规定，有关这些妇女对性别不平等态度的推定完全是基于一些人对某些群体生活方式的偏见。从来没有一个佩戴全脸面纱的女人提倡男女不平等。

3.8至于保护公共秩序，如果立法机构按照一些议员的建议，选择将禁止佩戴全脸面纱的规定限制于某些场所或场合，或规定为识别身份需要暂时揭开面纱的义务，那么保护公共秩序则是唯一可以留用的法律依据。然而，这并不是法国政府选择的做法。

3.9提交人指出，从未有人指称穿着罩袍或面纱的妇女威胁公共安全或制造公共动乱，而她们是极少数群体。虽然可以合理地主张，在某些特定情况下，确实需要能够在公共场所在人们面部无遮挡的情况下识别其身份，但这种“摘除面纱”的义务要成为永久性和绝对性的义务，这是不可想象的。只有具体的、有限的限制才能得到容忍。该法规定的这项禁令性质十分笼统，因此不能认为该禁令是保护公共秩序所必需的。

3.10无论如何，该禁令都与其目标不相称，因为该禁令是永久的，涵盖所有公共场所，且违反禁令构成刑事犯罪。佩戴全脸面纱这种遮挡脸部的方法，在法令草案和在通过该法之前的辩论中被特别针对――显然，佩戴全脸面纱永远无法根据该法第2条第2款规定的例外情况得到批准。

3.11欧洲人权法院在S.A.S.诉法国案的判决中，适用了相称性原则，驳回了法国援引的保护公共安全和公共秩序的目标。因此，禁止在公共场所遮挡脸部对保护公共安全和公共秩序而言不是必要的，禁令显然与所述目标并不相称。

3.12关于根据第二十六条提出的申诉，提交人认为，该法的适用具有间接歧视性，因为该法实际上妨碍了她行使宗教自由和行动自由。该法对待提交人的方式不同于该法对待其他人的方式。该法迫使她不在公共场合佩戴面纱(如果她不想面临遭受刑事处罚的风险)，而对她来说，佩戴面纱是一种宗教义务。由于她佩戴面纱的唯一办法是避免外出及在公共场所活动，她的行动自由受到限制，而行动自由是《公约》第十二条明确保障的。

3.13虽然该法应不加区别地适用于任何在公共场合遮盖面部的人，但实际情况仍然是，该法造成了间接歧视佩戴全脸面纱的妇女的效果。通过该法之前的辩论清楚地表明，该法被认为是在法律上明令禁止佩戴全脸面纱的一种通用解决办法。与该法执行情况有关的数据也证实了这种间接歧视，尽管该法本应涵盖任何类型的遮盖面部情形，包括头盔和滑雪面罩。

3.14最后，提交人重申，法国有2,000名妇女佩戴全脸面纱。依据该法受检人员一半以上为这些妇女，这表明她们不成比例地受到检查。

3.15因此，提交人吁请委员会认定缔约国违反了《公约》第十八条和第二十六条。

缔约国关于可否受理的意见

4.1在2016年11月15日的普通照会中，缔约国就来文可否受理提交了意见，并请委员会根据《任择议定书》第五条第2款(子)项和(丑)项宣布来文不可受理。

4.22012年3月26日，南特社区法院判定提交人有罪，罪名是在公共场所佩戴面纱，并处以150欧元罚金。提交人没有出席这次庭审。提交人随后向最高法院刑事庭提出复审申请，最高法院刑事庭在2013年4月3日的决定中驳回了申请，理由是“该理由涉及违反《欧洲人权公约》的情况，由于没有提交给初审法官，且包含补充的实情证据，该理由为新理由，因此不可受理”。提交人随后向欧洲人权法院提出申诉，该法院于2014年9月11日致函通知提交人，其申诉不可受理。

4.3缔约国回顾其在批准《任择议定书》时对第五条第2款(子)项提出的保留。缔约国回顾，委员会的惯例是，如果案件纯粹因程序原因被驳回，则不认为该事项已由另一国际机构“审查”。相反，根据对申诉实质问题的审议作出的不可受理决定也构成第五条第2款(子)项意义上的审查，哪怕这种审议非常有限或并未言明。

4.4在本案中，欧洲人权法院向提交人作出的宣布其申诉不可受理的决定没有援引不可受理的理由。然而，《欧洲人权公约》第34至第35条规定了不可受理的六项理由：(a)超过提交申请的六个月期限，从国内终局决定作出之日起算；(b)申诉是匿名的；(c) 所涉事项已提交至另一国际调查或解决程序审查；(d) 尚未用尽国内补救办法；(e) 申请明显缺乏根据或属于滥用情形；(f) 申请人未遭受重大不利。

4.5提交人的申诉是在六个月之内实名单独向欧洲人权法院提交的，而且提交人声称遭受的不利属于《欧洲人权公约》第34条意义上的重大不利，有鉴于此，缔约国认为，不言自明的是，欧洲人权法院驳回提交人申诉的原因必然只能是尚未用尽国内补救办法，或是该申诉被视为明显缺乏依据或属于滥用情形。

4.6在第一种情况下，委员会只能得出与欧洲人权法院相同的结论，因为提交人是在最高上诉程序中首次提出违反《公约》第十八条和第二十六条的申诉。因此，正如委员会在Bikramjit Singh案中就第十七条所做的处理，委员会应宣布，由于未用尽国内补救办法，申诉不予受理。

4.7在第二种情况下，如果欧洲人权法院驳回了该法院认为明显缺乏依据的申诉，那么该法院必然已经审查了申请人提出的申诉，这意味着该法院对案件实质问题进行了审查。由于法国提出的保留，这也将使委员会失去管辖权。

4.8缔约国认为，委员会收到的案件不是同一案件的主张是不能接受的。本来文涉及的事实和情况与提交欧洲人权法院的申诉相同。而且，所提出的问题是相同的。

4.9委员会已经指出，要求用尽国内补救办法的条件没有得到满足，因为提交人向委员会提出的申诉是她在最高上诉程序中首次提出的。因为提交人不曾向普通法院提及这些理由，国内最高法院宣布这些理由不可受理。

4.10提交人被正式传唤出席听讯，并有机会寻求律师援助为其辩护，但她没有这样做；事实上，她选择不出席庭审。她不能将自身的失误作为论据。综上所述，缔约国请委员会宣布来文不可受理。

缔约国关于实质问题的意见

5.1缔约国在2017年3月14日关于来文实质问题的意见中主张，国民议会和参议院经过广泛的民主辩论，在仅差一票的情况下，全体一致通过了该法。在此背景下，一个由各政治派别民选代表组成的议会特别工作组由此成立，工作组听取了许多秉持不同观点的人员的意见，包括穆斯林和非穆斯林妇女以及民间社会行为者的意见。

5.22010年5月11日，在通过该法之前，国民议会通过了一项决议，指出有损人类尊严和男女平等的激进做法，包括穿戴全脸面纱的做法违背共和国的价值观，要求采取一切可能的措施，确保有效保护遭受暴力或压力的妇女，包括被迫戴上全脸面纱的妇女。

5.3该法规定的普遍禁令的范围极为有限，因为只禁止遮盖面部。此外，这一措施对于捍卫该法立法所依据的原则至关重要，对违反第1条的行为(适用于选择佩戴伊斯兰全脸面纱的妇女)的处罚是适度的，立法者优先考虑教育的作用。因此，该法在捍卫民主社会的基本原则与根据个人宗教或其他信仰自由着装之间取得了合理的平衡。

5.4缔约国强调，该国并不是唯一禁止在公共场所穿着遮盖面部衣物的国家。例如，比利时联邦议会通过了同样的禁令，意大利议会众议院也通过了一项类似的法案。

5.5该法规定的禁令涵盖在公共场所意图遮盖面部的任何衣物，不论其形式或穿着的理由。因此，没有针对出于宗教或文化原因所穿服饰的特殊待遇。然而，当出于宗教原因而穿着某些意图遮盖面部的衣物时，该禁令可被视为对表明个人宗教或信仰自由的“限制”(实在法)。

5.6有关限制是法律规定的，是为实现正当目标，并与这一目标相称。这项禁令和例外情况都有清晰和准确的规定。2011年3月2日的一份通告全面解释了该法的适用范围和方式，并辅之以公共场所的宣传运动、政府办公室的传单以及教育网站。该法规定从颁布到生效为期六个月，因此符合可预见性要求；提交人知道她可能会被处以罚款。

5.7这项受到指责的法令旨在实现一个正当目标，即保护他人的权利和自由以及保护公共秩序，这是《公约》第十八条第三款所列的理由之一。这些目标在该法的序言中有明确定义，其中重申了共和国的价值观和共同生活的要求。在这方面，欧洲人权法院在S.A.S.诉法国案的判决中认为，禁令只有在寻求保障“共同生活”的条件时才是合理的，而政府将其界定为遵守社会生活的最低要求。公共场所是个人被要求与他人互动的典型的社会空间。在这种互动中，面部起着突出的作用，因为面部是个人及其对话者的共同人性得到承认的身体部位。露出面部不仅表示同意被对话者视为个体，也表示同意不以不公平的方式掩盖建立关系的精神，因此这是在如法国社会的开放和平等的社会中共同生活所需的最低程度的信任的表现。遮盖面部会妨碍个人身份的识别，并可能损害人际间的互动，破坏在多元社会中共同生活的条件。

5.8公共安全和公共秩序要求在必要时能够识别每个人的身份，以防止对人身和财产安全的攻击，并打击身份欺诈行为。这意味着人们必须露出面部，这在国际恐怖主义威胁的背景下至关重要。

5.9缔约国不同意将该法定性为禁止穆斯林妇女佩戴面纱表明其宗教信仰，并具体指出，该法只禁止完全遮盖面部，不论原因，并允许任何人在公共场所穿戴意图表达宗教信仰的服装，如头巾或缠头巾，只要能露出面部即可。此处的问题与公职人员在公共服务中或在学校佩戴宗教标志的问题不甚相同，因为后者关系到公共服务的中立性。在本案中，禁令并非基于有关服装的宗教含义，而仅是基于这些服装遮挡整个面部这一事实。只有“使人在公共场合隐形的最激进的服装形式受到影响”。提交人戴着头巾可以轻易出入公共场所，而佩戴头巾可以在不遮盖面部的情况下表明她的宗教信仰。此外，宪法委员会指出，该禁令不能限制在向公众开放的礼拜场所行使宗教自由。因此，正如欧洲人权法院在上述S.A.S.诉法国案中确认的，这项措施与其目的相称，缔约国在本案中没有超出其判断余地。此外，最高法院在2013年3月5日的判决中裁定，该法符合《欧洲人权公约》第9条(关于思想、良心和宗教自由)。最后，该法规定的惩处措施，其最高处罚是处以第二类罪行罚金(150欧元)，力度适中，与所追求的目标相称。关于公民资格课程这一替代处罚办法，这是法国刑法中适用于许多罪行的典型惩罚。其作用是提醒犯罪者有关容忍和尊重人类尊严的共和国价值观，并使犯罪者认识到他们的刑事和民事责任以及他们作为社会成员的义务。

5.10总理在2011年3月31日致省长的通知中澄清了警察和宪兵在处理犯罪者时应遵循的程序，并指出该法绝不授权执法人员强迫人们脱除衣物。因此，不能说对个人宗教自由施加了不成比例的限制。

5.11关于提交人声称的缔约国违反《公约》第十二条和第二十六条的问题，提交人未能证实该法实施的禁令只针对佩戴全脸面纱的妇女，也未能证实以其他方式遮盖面部的人不会被逮捕。相反，该法规定了一项普适的禁令，不针对任何具体的服装，也没有区分男女。此外，该法规定的禁令不能被解读为具有内在歧视性或妨碍行动自由，因为该法具备客观和合理的理由。

委员会需处理的问题和议事情况

审议可否受理

6.1在审议来文所载的任何请求之前，委员会必须根据其议事规则第93条，决定来文是否符合《任择议定书》规定的受理条件。

6.2委员会注意到，提交人就同样的事项向欧洲人权法院提出了申诉。提交人从2014年9月11日的信函中获悉，独任法官宣布该申诉不可受理，理由是不符合《欧洲人权公约》第34条和第35条规定的受理条件。委员会回顾，法国在批准《任择议定书》时提出了保留，不承认委员会有权审议正由或已由另一国际调查或解决程序审查的案件。

6.3委员会回顾其关于《任择议定书》第五条第2款(子)项的判例，大意是当欧洲人权法院宣布不可受理的理由不仅仅是程序性理由，也包含对实质问题进行一定程度审议后形成的理由时，同一事项应被视为已在对《任择议定书》第五条第2款(子)项的相应保留的意义内得到“审查”。因此，委员会需确定，就所涉案件而言，欧洲人权法院在宣布申诉因未能满足《欧洲人权公约》第34至第35规定的受理条件而不可受理时，是否仅单纯审查了可否受理的形式上的标准。

6.4委员会从欧洲人权法院援引第34至第35条的信函中看出，提交人的申诉似乎并非纯粹基于程序性理由而被宣布不可受理。然而，委员会注意到，从该法院所给理由的简洁性来看，显然没有向提交人提供关于不可受理决定的论证或澄清，以证明驳回申请的决定是基于实质问题作出的。鉴于上述具体情况，委员会认为，委员会无法确定提交人的案件是否已受到基于案情实质的审查，不管这种审查多么有限。鉴于上述原因，委员会认为，法国就《任择议定书》第五条第2款(子)项提出的保留本身并不妨碍委员会审议本案的实质问题。

6.5关于《任择议定书》第五条第2款(丑)项规定的用尽国内补救办法的要求，缔约国指出，委员会目前收到的关于侵犯权利的申诉是提交人在向最高法院刑事庭提出复审申请时首次提出的，该法院认为她的理由不可受理，因为是该理由本应向下级法院提出。缔约国提及Bikramjit Singh一案，以表明国内补救办法尚未用尽。提交人反驳了这一说法，指出Bikramjit Singh案与她的情况并不相似，因为提交人在上诉至最高法院之前提出申诉的唯一机会是向社区法院提出申诉。在这方面，提交人强调，社区法院的审理速度极快，由通常并非职业法官的独任法官出席，且不得上诉；提交人还强调她没有律师代理。提交人还主张，她向最高法院提出申诉是适当的，因为与合宪性的事后审查一样，这些申诉提出了《民事诉讼法》第619条规定的“纯粹的法律”理由。

6.6委员会注意到，缔约国没有反驳这些指控，特别是关于社区法院的审理程序及其在提交人案件中的可用性和有效性的指控。委员会还注意到，社区法院是一个公共场所，根据第2010-1192号法，在社区法院佩戴面纱将构成刑事犯罪，而提交人没有出席庭审。委员会还注意到，Bikramjit Singh案不涉及刑事诉讼，在刑事诉讼中上诉权必须得到保障，而且该案中的提交人在尝试向最高法院提出新的申诉之前，有机会向两个下级法院提出申诉。另一方面，在本案中，提交人的申诉无法上诉至除最高法院以外的其他法院，以获复审。根据委员会收到的所有资料，及在缔约国未作进一步解释的情况下，委员会得出结论认为，可合理利用的国内补救办法已经用尽。

6.7委员会认为，就可否受理而言，提交人根据《公约》第十八和第二十六条提出的申诉已得到充分证实，因此宣布申诉可以受理，并着手审查申诉的实质问题。

审议实质问题

7.1委员会根据《任择议定书》第五条第1款，结合各当事方提交的所有资料审议了本来文。

7.2委员会注意到，提交人声称，该法规定的禁止在公共场所遮盖面部的刑事禁令以及提交人因佩戴面纱而被定罪的情况侵犯了她根据《公约》第十八条享有的权利。委员会注意到缔约国的论点，即该法普遍禁止在公共场所穿戴任何意图遮盖面部的服装，不论其形式或穿着理由，而且该法没有特别针对宗教服装。然而，委员会注意到，第2条第2款广泛地将下述内容排除于该法之外：出于健康或职业原因穿着的衣物，属于体育、艺术或传统节日或活动的衣物，或其他法律允许的衣物。委员会还注意到，提交人提出，在法国佩戴全脸面纱的妇女不到2,000人，而且依据该法进行的绝大多数检查都是针对佩戴全脸面纱的妇女进行的，缔约国对此没有提出异议。

7.3委员会回顾其第22号一般性意见(1993年)，其中指出表明宗教或信仰的自由既可单独行使，也可与他人集体行使，既可公开行使，也可私下行使。宗教或信仰的信守和崇奉不仅包括典礼，也包括穿戴特殊服装或头巾等习俗。无可争议的是，正如提交人所声称的，佩戴全脸面纱是一部分穆斯林信徒的习俗，是信守和崇奉宗教的一部分。同样无可争议的是，该法适用于提交人所戴的面纱，提交人因此被迫放弃按照其宗教信仰着装，否则将面临惩罚。因此，委员会认为，该法规定的禁令约束或限制了提交人穿戴面纱以行使《公约》第十八条第1款意义内的表明其宗教或信仰的权利。

7.4因此，委员会必须确定这一限制是否属于《公约》第十八条第三款所授权的限制。委员会回顾第十八条第三款允许限制表明自己宗教或信仰的自由的情况仅限于法律所规定的限制，以及为保障公共安全、秩序、卫生、或道德、或他人的基本权利和自由所必需的限制。此外，委员会认为，第十八条第三款应做严格解释：不许基于其中不曾规定的原因施加限制，即便这些限制作为《公约》中受保护的权利的限制，例如国家安全，可予允许。施加限制的目的仅限于明文规定的，并且必需同所指特定需要直接有关或者相称。施加的限制不得基于歧视性的目的或采取歧视性的做法。

7.5委员会注意到在本案中，禁止佩戴面纱显然属于该法的范围，与该法第1条的规定一致，这一点没有争议。所以委员会有责任评估这一法律规定的限制是否追求正当目标，是否为实现该目标所必要，是否相称并且无歧视。

7.6委员会注意到，缔约国提出了该法据称追求的两个目标，即保护公共安全和公共秩序以及保护他人的权利和自由。

7.7关于保护公共安全和秩序，缔约国主张，必须能够在必要时查明所有个人的身份，以防止对人身和财产安全的威胁，并打击身份欺诈行为。委员会承认，在某些情况下，缔约国有要求个人露出面部的需要，这可能意味着在公共安全或秩序面临风险的特定情况下或为了识别身份的目的而偶尔露出面部。然而，委员会注意到，该法并不局限于这种情况，而是全面禁止任何时候在公共场合穿戴某些面部遮挡物，缔约国没有证明佩戴全脸面纱本身如何对公共安全或公共秩序构成威胁，从而需要实行这种绝对禁令。缔约国也没有提供任何有关公共安全的理由或解释，说明为什么禁止为某些宗教目的遮盖面部，即佩戴面纱，而允许为包括体育、艺术和其他传统和宗教目的在内的许多其他目的遮盖面部。委员会还注意到，缔约国没有说明在何种具体情况下会对公共安全和公共秩序构成真实而重大的威胁，从而需要全面禁止佩戴全脸面纱，也没有提供任何实例。该法的序言或该法通过之前的2010年5月11日国民议会决议似乎也没有提到存在这种威胁。

7.8即使缔约国能够证明原则上存在对公共安全和公共秩序的真正而重大的威胁，缔约国也没有证明该法规定的禁令与这一目标相称，特别是考虑到该法的诸多例外情形及其对身为佩戴全脸面纱的穆斯林妇女的提交人的巨大影响。缔约国也未试图证明该禁令是确保保护宗教或信仰自由所必需的、限制性最小的措施。

7.9关于缔约国提出的第二项目标，即根据第十八条第三款保护他人的基本权利和自由，委员会注意到缔约国根据“共同生活”的概念或遵守社会生活最低要求提出的论点。据缔约国称，露出面部表示同意被对话者识别身份，而不是“不公平地”隐瞒自己的心态，这是“在一个开放和平等的社会中共同生活所需要的最低程度的信任”。委员会还注意到，提交人声称，立法机构既没有在该法内容中也没有在目的声明中明确界定这一目标。委员会承认，一个国家可能有兴趣促进其领土内个人之间的社会交往和相互尊重，并在这一背景下促进各种不同个人之间的社会互动，因此，遮盖面部可被视为这种互动的潜在障碍。

7.10然而，委员会注意到，保护他人的基本权利和自由需要确定受影响的具体基本权利和受影响的人。第十八条第三款规定的例外情况应作严格解释，不应抽象适用。在本案中，委员会认为，“共同生活”的概念是一个非常模糊和抽象的术语。缔约国没有确定其他人的任何具体基本权利或自由受到一些在公共场所遮盖面部的人(包括佩戴全脸面纱的妇女)的影响。缔约国也没有解释为什么在公共场所佩戴全脸面纱会“不公平地”妨碍这些权利，而该法豁免的在公共场所遮盖面部的许多其他手段不会造成这种妨碍。在公共场所与任何人交流的权利和不因某人佩戴全脸面纱而受到干扰的权利不受《公约》保护，因此不能构成《公约》第十八条第三款意义内允许的限制。

7.11即使假设共同生活的概念可被视为第十八条第三款意义内的“正当目标”，缔约国也没有证明禁止在公共场所用某些方式遮盖面部的刑事禁令是与该目标相称的，或者是保护宗教或信仰自由的限制性最小的手段，而该禁令对身为佩戴全脸面纱的穆斯林妇女的提交人的权利和自由构成重大限制。

7.12鉴于上述情况，委员会认为，缔约国未能证明，限制提交人佩戴面纱表明其宗教或信仰的自由是《公约》第十八条第三款意义上的必要的和相称的。因此，委员会得出结论认为，该法规定的禁令以及根据该法对提交人佩戴面纱的行为进行定罪侵犯了提交人根据《公约》第十八条享有的权利。

7.13关于提交人根据《公约》第二十六条提出的申诉，即该法构成了对佩戴全脸面纱的少数穆斯林妇女的间接歧视，委员会注意到缔约国的论点，即该法规定的禁令不是基于有关服装的宗教含义，而是基于其遮盖面部的事实。据缔约国称，只有“使人在公共场合隐形的最激进的服装形式”会受到影响，因此，提交人可以佩戴头巾进入公共场所，这样可以在不遮挡脸部的情况下表明她的宗教信仰。然而，委员会注意到，国民议会在其关于决心维护共和国价值观以应对削弱这些价值观的激进做法的发展的决议中认为，包括佩戴全脸面纱在内的有损人类尊严和男女平等的激进做法与共和国的价值观背道而驰，国民议会希望打击歧视和促进男女平等成为公共政策的优先事项。委员会还注意到，该法虽然是以一般性措辞起草的，但将在公共场合遮盖面部的大多数情况都定为例外，因此将禁令的适用范围基本限制于伊斯兰全脸面纱，而且该法主要针对佩戴全脸面纱的妇女执行。因此，从该法的案文、通过前的辩论和实际执行情况来看，委员会认为该法主要适用于伊斯兰全脸面纱，而这是少数穆斯林妇女的一种宗教信守和身份认同的形式。

7.14委员会回顾其第22号一般性意见(1993年)，其中委员会关注基于任何理由歧视任何宗教或信仰的任何趋势，包括这样的事实：被歧视者是可能为处于支配地位的宗教团体所仇视的宗教少数。违反第二十六条的情况可能是表面上中立或没有歧视意图的规则或措施产生的歧视性效果所致。委员会还回顾，关于妇女在公共场合着装的规定可能侵犯《公约》保障的若干权利，如关于不歧视的第二十六条。但是，并非每一种基于第二十六条所列理由的区别对待都构成歧视，只要这种区别对待有合理和客观的标准为依据，并且是为了实现《公约》规定的正当目标，就不是歧视。因此，委员会必须确定，相较于依据该法第2条规定的例外情况所准许的遮盖面部的其他形式，对佩戴伊斯兰全脸面纱的提交人的区别对待是否符合目的的合理性、客观性和合法性标准。

7.15委员会注意到，缔约国没有提供任何解释，说明为什么全面禁止提交人配戴面纱是合理或正当的，与该法允许的例外情况不同。委员会还注意到，该法规定的针对佩戴全脸面纱的全面禁令似乎是基于这样一种假设，即佩戴全脸面纱本质上具有歧视性，妇女佩戴面纱是被迫的。委员会承认，有些妇女可能受到家庭或社会的压力被迫遮盖面部，但委员会注意到，佩戴全脸面纱也可能是基于宗教信仰的一种选择，甚至是宣布所有权的一种手段，提交人的情况就是如此。委员会还认为，这一禁令非但不能保护佩戴全脸面纱的妇女，反而会产生相反的效果，将她们限制在家中，阻碍她们获得公共服务，使她们面临虐待和边缘化的危险。事实上，委员会以前曾表示关切，该法禁止在公共场所遮盖面部侵犯了表达个人宗教或信仰的自由，对特定宗教的成员和女童产生了不成比例的影响；该法致使某些群体感觉遭到排斥和边缘化，这可能与预期目标背道而驰。委员会还注意到，该法的一项单独条款，即《刑法典》第225-4-10条，将强迫个人遮挡面部的严重罪行定为刑事犯罪，从而具体解决了所述的关切。

7.16最后，尽管缔约国主张，对决定在公共场合佩戴全脸面纱的妇女实施的惩罚是“适度的”，但委员会注意到，这些处罚具有刑事性质，而且已经多次对一些妇女实施。这种惩罚必然会对提交人佩戴面纱表明其宗教的权利产生不利影响，也可能对其他权利产生不利影响。

7.17鉴于上述情况，委员会认为，该法第1条规定的刑事禁令对身为选择佩戴全脸面纱的穆斯林妇女的提交人产生了不成比例的影响，并区别对待提交人和其他可以在公共场合合法遮挡面部的人，这对实现正当利益是不必要和不相称的，因此是不合理的。因此，委员会得出结论，这项条款及其对提交人的适用构成了基于性别和宗教的交叉歧视，违反了《公约》第二十六条。

8.委员会依《任择议定书》第五条第4款行事，认为现有事实显示缔约国违反了《公约》第十八和第二十六条。

9.根据《公约》第二条第三款(子)项，缔约国有义务给予提交人有效的补救。这要求缔约国向《公约》权利受到侵犯的个人提供充分赔偿。因此，缔约国有义务除其他外，就提交人所遭受的伤害向其提供适当补偿措施，包括经济赔偿。缔约国还有义务采取一切必要步骤，防止今后发生类似的侵权行为，包括根据《公约》规定的义务，特别是《公约》第十八条和第二十六条，审查第2010-1192号法。

10.缔约国加入《任择议定书》即已承认委员会有权确定是否存在违反《公约》的情况，而且根据《公约》第二条，缔约国也已承诺确保在其领土内和受其管辖的所有个人享有《公约》承认的权利，并承诺如违约行为经确定成立，即予以有效且可强制执行的补救。鉴此，委员会希望缔约国在180天内提供资料，说明采取措施落实委员会《意见》的情况。此外，还请缔约国公布本意见，并以缔约国的官方语言广泛传播。

Annex I

Joint opinion of Committee members Ilze Brands Kehris , Sarah Cleveland, Christof Heyns , Marcia V.J . Kran and Yuval Shany (concurring)

1.We agree with the majority of the Committee that France, the respondent State, did not adequately explain a security rationale that could justify the blanket ban on Muslim religious full-face coverage, especially in the light of the exceptions for other forms of full-face coverage made under Act No. 2010-1192. We also agree with the majority that the State party has not persuasively explained how the interest of “living together” could justify compelling, under threat of criminal sanction, individuals belonging to a religious minority to dress in a manner conducive to “normal” social interaction.

2.We are more receptive, however, to the implicit claim that thefull veil is discriminatory (para. 7.15), as we consider the wearing of the full veil to be a traditional practice that has allowed men to subjugate women in the name of preserving their “modesty”,which results in women not being entitled to occupy public space on the same terms as men. We would therefore have no difficulty in regarding France as entitled – and, in fact, under an obligation, pursuant to articles 2 (1), 3 and 26 of the Covenant, as well as article 5 (a) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women – to take all appropriate measures to address this pattern of conduct so as to ensure that it does not result in discrimination against women.

3.The question remains, however, whether the introduction of a blanket ban on the full-face veil in public, enforced through a criminal sanction imposed on the very women such a ban would purport to protect, is an appropriate measure in the circumstances of the present case – that is, whether it was a reasonable and proportional measure directed against the author and other Muslim women. On this matter, we are of the view that the State party has not demonstrated to the Committee that less intrusive measures than the blanket ban, such as education and awareness-raising against the negative implications of wearing the full-face veil, criminalizing all forms of pressure on women to wear such a veil and a limited ban enforced through appropriate non-criminal sanctions on wearing the full veil in specific social contexts, underscoring the State’s opposition to the practice (such as prohibiting the full-face veil for teachers in public schools or government employees addressing the public), would not have resulted in sufficient modification of the practice of wearing the full veil, while respecting the rights to privacy, autonomy and religious freedom of the women themselves, including those who choose to wear the veil.

4.Given the harsh consequences of the full ban on the ability of women who choose to wear the veil to move freely in public, we are not in a position to accept the Act as a reasonable and proportionate measure compatible with the Covenant. We believe that our position on the high threshold for justifying a ban on clothing chosen by women is generally consistent with the relevant parts of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in S.A.S. v France, in which the Court rejected a justification of the ban on the grounds of, among others, anti-discrimination.

Annex II

Joint opinion of Committee members Ilze Brands Kehris and Sarah Cleveland (concurring)

1.We concur with the majority opinion. Regarding the stated aim of promoting public safety and order, we consider that the State party has not only failed to establish a comprehensive, significant and specific threat that would justify a blanket ban on wearing the full-face veil in public, but has also not explained in which ways the State party’s previously existing legislation providing for uncovering one’s face in public space for specific purposes or at specific times, such as security checks and identity checks, or in specific locations, such as schools and hospitals – which are not contested here – is not adequate to ensure public safety and order. Thus, in addition to the criminal nature of the sanction and its effect on the author and those Muslim women who, like her, choose to wear the full-face veil, which is not proportionate to the stated aim (para. 7.11), this blanket ban has not been shown to be either necessary or proportionate to its stated legitimate aim of promoting public safety.

2.With respect to protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of others and the concept of “living together” that the State party relates to this aim, there is a lack of clarity regarding which fundamental rights are specifically intended to be protected (para. 7.10). The State party’s position is also unclear on how respect for the rights of persons belonging to minorities, including religious minorities, are taken into account in this concept in order to safeguard the value of pluralism and avoid the abuse of a dominant position by the majority.This reinforces the doubts about the claim that the concept of “living together” constitutes a legitimate aim under the fundamental rights and freedom of others in article 18 (3) of the Covenant.

3.Although the State party does not explicitly refer to equality between men and women in its arguments, in the background documents from the national debates and the preparatory work in the National Assembly, equality figured as a significant factor in the adoption of this legislation. In this regard, the argument that the full-face veil is inherently oppressive and stems from the patriarchal subjugation of women, which intends to prevent them from participating as equals in society, is relevant. However, in view of the fact that another criminal provision in article 4 of the same Act, which is not contested, penalizes the serious offence of compelling a person to wear such a veil, the argument as applied to the comprehensive ban on wearing the veil seems to imply that whenever a woman dons a full-face veil it cannot be her own informed and autonomous decision, which may reinforce a stereotype that Muslim women are oppressed. Penalizing wearing the full-face veil in order to protect women could thus, instead of promoting gender equality, potentially contribute to the further stigmatization of Muslim women who choose to wear the full-face veil, as well as more broadly of Muslims, based on a stereotypical perception of the role of women among Muslims. In any case, the State or the majority’s view that the practice is oppressive must accommodate the author’s own explicit choice to wear certain clothing in public to manifest her religious belief.The equality argument is thus not convincing as a legitimate aim for a blanket prohibition of full-face veils in all public spaces in France.

4.Finally, the present Views take into account the specific context of the case in France, including the fact that a very small number of women have chosen to wear the full veil. Apart from the inherent vulnerability to negative stereotyping of members of a minority – indeed, a minority within a minority – the disproportionality of the legislative measures that were adopted and implemented purportedly to promote respect for the rights of others is thus particularly acute in a context in which there is a very low likelihood that any person would encounter a fully veiled woman in a public space. For the same reason, disseminating awareness-raising leaflets to the general public regarding the law and criminalizing the wearing of the niqab and burka may have the unintended effect of increasing prejudice and intolerance towards this minority group.

Annex III

Individual opinion of Committee member Yadh Ben Achour (dissenting)

1.In both cases set out in communications Nos. 2747/2016 and 2807/2016, the Committee notes that the State party, by adopting Act No. 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010, prohibiting the concealment of the face in public, has violated the rights of the authors under articles 18 and 26 of the Covenant. I regret that I am unable to share this opinion for the following reasons.

2.First, I am surprised at the Committee’s statement that “the State party has not demonstrated how wearing the full-face veil in itself poses a threat to public safety or public order that would justify such an absolute ban”. I shall not dwell on the threat to public safety, which appears self-evident given the ongoing battle against terrorists, some of whom have carried out attacks and assassinations in France and elsewhere disguised with niqabs. Security considerations alone justify both prohibition and criminalization. I shall, however, spend more time on the meaning of the phrase “protect order” read conjointly with “protect the morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others” in article 18 (3) of the Covenant.

3.In that article, the term “order” clearly refers to that of the State at the origin of the restriction. In France, under its Constitution, the order is republican, secular and democratic. Equality between men and women is among the most fundamental principles of that order, just as it is among the most fundamental principles of the Covenant. The niqab in itself is a symbol of the stigmatization and degrading of women and as such contrary to the republican order and gender equality in the State party, but also to articles 3 and 26 of the Covenant. Defenders of the niqab reduce women to their primary biological status as females, as sexual objects, flesh without mind or reason, potentially to blame for cosmic and moral disorder, and in consequence obliged to remove themselves from the male gaze and thus be virtually banished from the public space. A democratic State cannot allow such stigmatization, which sets them apart from all other women. Wearing the niqab violates the “fundamental rights and freedoms of others” or, more precisely, the rights of other women and of women as such. Its prohibition is therefore not contrary to the Covenant.

4.I agree with the Committee that the restrictions provided for under article 18 (3) must be interpreted strictly. However, “strictly” does not mean that the restrictions need not respect the other provisions of the Covenant, or the spirit of article 18 itself, as I have explained in the preceding paragraph.

5.The Committee admits in both cases that “wearing the niqab or the burka amounts to wearing a garment that is customary for a segment of the Muslim faithful and that it is the performance of a rite or practice of a religion”. However, the Committee does not explain the mysterious transformation of a custom into a religious obligation as part of worship, within the meaning of article 18 of the Covenant. The truth is that the wearing of the niqab or the burka is a custom followed in certain countries called “Muslim countries” that, under the influence of political Islamism and a growing puritanism, has been artificially linked to certain verses from the Qur’an, in particular to verse 31 of the Surah of Light and verse 59 of the Surah of the Confederates. However, the most knowledgeable authorities on Islam do not recognize concealing the face as a religious obligation. Even allowing, as the Committee wishes to do, that the wearing of the niqab may be interpreted as an expression of freedom of religion, it must not be forgotten that not all interpretations are equal in the eyes of a democratic society that has founded its legal system on human rights and the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the Covenant, and that has enshrined the principle of secularism within its Constitution – all the more so given the particular historical and legal context of France. Certain interpretations simply cannot be tolerated.

6.The same holds true for polygamy, excision, inequality in inheritance, repudiation of a wife, a husband’s right to discipline his wife and levirate and sororate practices. All those constitute, for their practitioners, religious obligations or rites, just as wearing the full-face veil does for followers of that custom. But the Committee has always considered the former practices to be contrary to the provisions of the Covenant and has consistently called on States to abolish them. Surely then, it is contradictory to decide in one case that it is the prohibition of one such practice, which undermines equality between citizens and the dignity of women, that contravenes the Covenant, while deciding in another case that it is the practices that contravene article 18?

7.A more serious problem must be raised. It concerns the concept of “living together” championed by France, which led to the adoption of the Act. I entirely disagree with the Committee that “the concept of ‘living together’ is presented by the State party in very vague and abstract terms” and that “the State party has not identified any specific fundamental rights or freedoms of others that are affected”. On the contrary, the preamble to the Act deals fully with this issue and clearly states that concealment of the face goes against the social contract, basic good manners and the notions of fraternity and living together. Unfortunately, the Committee fails to note that the fundamental right that is violated in this instance is not that of a few individuals, nor of any particular group, but the right of society as a whole to recognize its members by their faces, which are also a token of our social and, indeed, our human nature. Contrary to the Committee’s assertions, the concept of living together is neither vague nor abstract, but rather, precise and specific. It is founded on the very simple idea that a democratic society can only function in full view of all. More generally, as I have already suggested, the most basic human communication, preceding language of any other kind, is conveyed by the face. By totally and permanently concealing our faces in public, especially in a democratic context, we renounce our own social nature and sever our links with our peers. To prohibit the wearing of the full-face veil and penalize it with a small fine is therefore neither excessive nor disproportionate. In this connection, there can be no comparison between the hijab and the niqab. The two are essentially different.

8.By considering that “the criminal ban introduced by article 1 of the Act disproportionately affects the author as a Muslim woman who chooses to wear the full-face veil and introduces a distinction between her and other persons who may legally cover their face in public that is not necessary and proportionate to a legitimate interest and is therefore unreasonable”, the Committee is simply turning rights upside down. It concludes from this reasoning that article 1 of the Act constitutes a kind of intersectional discrimination based on sex and religion that violates article 26 of the Covenant. Yet there is no doubt that prohibition is necessary, if only because of the threat to security (para. 2 above); it is also proportionate, as shown by the light penalty: a fine of €150 and a course in citizenship, richly deserved given the seriousness of the infringement of equality between citizens and of the dignity of women.

9.Let us now turn to the question of those persons who, unlike women who wear the full-face veil, are authorized by the Act to cover their faces. This, according to the Committee’s Views, constitutes discrimination under article 26 of the Covenant. These are the persons referred to in article 2 (2) of the Act, which establishes exceptions to the prohibition. Can these exceptions be placed on an equal footing and compared with the practice of wearing the full-face veil? Is article 2 of the Act discriminatory within the meaning of article 26? I do not think so. These exceptions, generally speaking circumstantial and temporary, are for the most part made for recreational, festive, carnival or sporting purposes, or are required for service or security purposes, in particular road safety. They exist in all countries and in no way constitute discriminatory symbols or messages likely to trigger implementation of article 26 of the Covenant, as the full-face veil would.

10.I conclude that the prohibition of the wearing of the full-face veil and its penalization by fine, especially in the French context, is neither contrary to article 18 nor to article 26 of the Covenant.

Annex IV

Individual opinion of Committee member José Manuel Santos Pais (dissenting)

1.I regret not being able to share the conclusion, reached by the majority of the Committee, that the State party violated the author’s rights under articles 18 and 26 of the Covenant.

2.Communications Nos. 2747/2016 and 2807/2016 concern the use of the niqab and are the first of their kind to be considered by the Committee. The issue is a very sensitive one and a solution should therefore be reached thoughtfully, due to its far-reaching implications.

3.Significantly enough, the two complaints do not concern an Islamic State, but a European one with a strong democratic tradition and an impressive human rights record. Possible solutions are dilemmatic, since persuasive arguments can be invoked both for and against finding a violation of certain rights. Decisions in both cases will have, apart from the underlying legal issues, a significant political impact, not only for France, but for many other countries in Europe, Africa and Asia, where the problem of the use of the niqab may also arise. The question was thus to find a solution that minimized the harm, while taking into account all the relevant factors and preventing the risk of any unwarranted and abusive interpretation of the Committee’s decision.

4.I tend to consider the complaints in both cases as mostly artificial, using the argument of a restriction of freedom of thought, conscience and religion as a means to address what is foremost a political problem. The authors never explain which religious prescriptions impose the use of the niqab on them or which part of the Qur’an they base their conclusions on. Yet they acknowledge that wearing the niqab or the burka amounts to wearing a garment that is customary for a segment of the Muslim faithful and is an act motivated by religious beliefs. Therefore, it concerns the observance and practice of a religion, notwithstanding the fact that wearing the niqab or the burka is not a religious requirement common to all practising Muslims (para. 3.2). We are therefore facing a religious custom, not an undisputed religious obligation.

5.The Committee has in the past refused to accept as violations of the provisions of the Covenantcertain social or religious customs and practices that run counter to human rights (female genital mutilation, honour and ritual killings, attacks against persons with albinism and many others). Therefore, the fact that the authors invoke a violation of their religious beliefs does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that their rights have been violated.

6.Both authors are nationals of France born and domiciled in France. Yet, they refuse to abide by the prevalent legislation of the State party concerned, although they acknowledge that they belong to a minority of Muslim women who wear the full-face veil. According to a parliamentary commission that studied the matter, fewer than 2,000 women are concerned (paras. 3.3 and 3.14), which constitutes a tiny minority (para. 3.9). They consider that such a tiny minority can impose their beliefs on the rest of the population, but do not wish to acknowledge the same right to the rest of the population, which, in terms of a proportionality test, seems quite disturbing, especially as both authors can use, still within the observance of their religious beliefs, other less rigorous and extreme forms of dressing, such as a headscarf. This extreme and radical form of religious belief should, in my view, be considered with caution so as to allow the Committee to reach a fair and reasonable decision, which unfortunately, in the present case, did not occur.

7.When one encounters a given society, the need for respecting its habits and customs should be a natural concern, as well as respect for social predominant values. Even more so, when one has a standing relationship with such a society, as is the case for both authors. Yet the authors refuse to accept this.

8.It falls within the legitimate powers of each State to democratically define the legislative framework of their societies, while respecting their international obligations. The State party has carefully done so. Act No. 2010-1192 was passed unanimously (bar one vote) by the National Assembly and Senate after a wide-ranging democratic debate. A parliamentary task force was set up involving elected representatives from across the political spectrum, which proceeded to hear many persons of diverse opinions, including both Muslim and non-Muslim women and persons from civil society (para. 5.1).On 11 May 2010 – prior to the adoption of the law – the National Assembly adopted a resolution in which it said that radical practices detrimental to human dignity and equality between men and women, including the wearing of a full-face veil, were contrary to the values of the Republic, and called for the implementation of all possible measures to ensure the effective protection of women subjected to violence or pressure, including by being forced to wear a full-face veil (para. 5.2).

9.The general ban introduced by the Act is limited in scope, given that only the concealment of the face is prohibited. Sanctions are measured, lawmakers having prioritized the role of education (para. 5.3).The ban covers any article of clothing intended to conceal the face in public spaces, regardless of the form it takes or the reason for wearing it (para. 5.5),and does not target any specific article of clothing and makes no distinction between men and women (para. 5.11).Therefore, no special treatment is reserved for garments worn for religious or cultural reasons and only the most radical form of clothing that makes the person invisible in public is affected. The ban cannot restrict the exercise of religious freedom in places of worship open to the public (para. 5.9).Exemptions from the Act include clothing worn for health or professional reasons, or as part of sporting, artistic or traditional festivities or events, including religious processions, or that otherwise is legally authorized (para. 7.2),which confirm the general and reasonable character of the ban. A circular of 2 March 2011 provided a comprehensive explanation of the scope and modalities for the application of the law, complemented by a campaign in public places and a leaflet available in government offices, as well as an educational website. Moreover, the law provided for a period of six months from the time of its enactment to its entry into force to meet the predictability requirement (para. 5.6).

10.The Act pursues a legitimate aim, the protection of the rights and freedoms of others and the protection of public order, as clearly defined in the Act’s preamble, which reaffirms the values of the Republic and the requirements of living together (para. 5.7).The European Court of Human Rights, in its judgment in S.A.S. v. France, accepted the observance of the minimum requirements of life in society as part of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others and so concluded that the ban imposed was proportionate to the aim pursued (paras. 140–159).

11.Public safety and public order require that everyone can be identified if need be, to prevent attacks on the security of persons and property and to combat identity fraud. This implies that people must show their faces, a vital concern in the context of current international terrorist threats (para. 5.8).The Committee, failing to address the underlying problem properly, does not seem to have sufficiently weighed this last requirement (para. 7.7).

12.It is true that the European Court of Human Rights, in its judgment in the S.A.S. v. France case, dismissed the argument that the ban was necessary in a democratic society for public safety, since “a blanket ban on the wearing in public places of clothing designed to conceal the face can be regarded as proportionate only in a context where there is a general threat to public safety” (para. 139). However, since the judgment was delivered, France has experienced several terrorist attacks by Al-Qaida and Da’esh: Île-de-France in January 2015 (20 killed and 22 injured), Paris in November 2015 (137 killed and 368 injured) and Nice in July 2016 (87 killed and 434 injured). In 2017, a total of 205 foiled, failed and completed terrorist attacks were reported by nine European Union member States (France experienced 54 attacks). In 2017, a total of 975 individuals were arrested in the European Union for terrorism-related offences. Most arrests (705 out of 791) were related to jihadist terrorism (123 women, of whom 64 per cent held the citizenship of a European Union member State and were born in the Union). France alone accounted for 411 arrests and 114 convictions. As for the number of suspects arrested for religiously inspired/jihadist terrorism (705), France accounted for 373.In this context, it is of extreme importance to quickly identify and locate possible suspects, since they travel through different countries to arrive at their destination and may avail themselves of the niqab to go unnoticed. Therefore, in the current circumstances, the ban imposed seems proportionate to the aim pursued by the Act, although it should be subject to periodic risk assessments (art. 7 of the Act).

13.In contrast to the view of the majority of the Committee (para 7.16), I believe that the sanctions are measured. Although they are of a criminal nature in France, in other countries they would probably be administrative fines. Sanctions comprise a category two fine (maximum €150), a moderate sanction that can, however, be replaced by a mandatory citizenship course. If, however, the person refuses to abide by the law, what should the State do? Accept such a behaviour? In the Yaker case, the author was sentenced twice, the second time because she refused to remove her full-face veil at the security checkpoint to enter the court. Is it reasonable to force a judge to accept persons that they are going to judge to have their faces covered during a trial? Such a demand will probably not be accepted in any court, in whichever country. Furthermore, both cases were tried by a community court, which confirms, if need be, the minor gravity of the violation. Sanctions are thus not disproportionate.

14.Finally, as regards the allegation that penalties have been imposed in particular on Islamic women, the reason seems obvious: they violated the ban. Would one consider, for instance, the prosecution of drunk drivers or drug traffickers as disproportionately affecting them? Is this not just the result of law enforcement policy?

15.I would therefore conclude that articles 18 and 26 of the Covenant were not violated. Rejecting the ban could, regrettably, be seen by some States as just a step away from accepting the imposition of a full-face veil policy.